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THE APA AND THE ASSAULT ON DEFERENCE
Ronald M. Levin *
Recently, in Kisor v. Wilkie, a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch argued at length
that § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act prohibits judicial deference to administrative
interpretations of law. That section states that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law.” This issue remained unresolved in Kisor, but the Supreme Court may well
return to it soon as a potential argument against the validity of Chevron deference. Although a
substantial academic literature has supported Gorsuch’s position on the APA question, this article
disagrees with it. It argues that the text of § 706, surrounding statutory provisions, the legislative
history, the case law background, and post-APA reactions all fail to support Gorsuch’s thesis. To
the contrary, a substantial tradition of deference antedated the Act, and Congress, not being
particularly concerned about this issue, left that tradition undisturbed. The article concludes by
arguing that Chevron deference, although not precisely foreseen when the APA was enacted,
makes a reasonable extrapolation from that era’s doctrines and is consistent with § 706.
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Introduction
This article examines the question of whether the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
forbids reviewing courts from displaying deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations of
the statutes and rules that they administer. Some readers might initially suppose that the answer
to that question is too self-evident to require exploration in a law review. After all, courts have
displayed such deference routinely during the entire seventy-plus years in which the APA has been
in force. But events of the past few years tell a different story. The propriety of such deference is
one of the most contested issues in current administrative law discourse. 1 A proposal to abolish
judicial deference to agencies’ legal interpretations even found its way into congressional
deliberations a few years ago, when the House of Representatives was under Republican control. 2
The deference debate has multiple dimensions, ranging from the constitutional to the prudential,
but the APA dimension has comprised one battleground in this wider war.
Kisor v. Wilkie 3 provides the most conspicuous evidence that the stated question is up for
grabs. In that 2019 case, the Supreme Court considered whether to overrule so-called Auer
deference. That doctrine, a close cousin of the better-known Chevron doctrine, 4 provides that an
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation is “controlling unless plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.” 5 The result was something of a standoff. A plurality opinion by
Justice Kagan reaffirmed support for Auer, 6 but Justice Gorsuch, in a lengthy separate opinion,
condemned Auer and lamented the Court’s failure to abandon it. 7 Among other reasons, Justice
Gorsuch relied on § 706 of the APA. The first sentence of that provision states that “the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” 8 According to
Gorsuch, § 706 commands independent, nondeferential review of legal issues, including agencies’
interpretations of their own regulations. 9 Although Kagan disagreed with this view, 10 the Kisor
1

See generally Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018).
2

See H.R. REP. NO. 114-622, at 5 (2016) (supporting the proposed Separation of Powers Restoration Act, in part
because “it has . . . been suggested that Chevron conflicts flatly with the express terms of the Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946”). The House later voted to adopt the amendment. H.R. 5, tit. 1, 115th Cong. § 107 (2017).
3

139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).

4

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

5

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quotation marks omitted). The doctrine was previously called
Seminole Rock deference, after an earlier case that recited the same verbal formula. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
6

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2410-14 (opinion of Kagan, J.).

7
Id. at 2425-48 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). Gorsuch’s opinion was technically a concurrence,
because he agreed with the majority’s decision to remand the case for further proceedings, but in its substance it was
more like a dissent.
8

5 U.S.C. § 706.

9

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2432-34, 2435-37 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

10

Id. at 2418-20 (plurality opinion).

2
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case as a whole did not resolve the question, because each of these two opinions spoke for only
four Justices. The deciding vote was cast by Chief Justice Roberts, who supported Auer only on
stare decisis grounds. 11 Roberts also concurred in Kagan’s opinion insofar as it articulated
limitations on the doctrine. 12
Presumably, Kisor’s inconclusive outcome means that conflict over the issues in the case,
including the § 706 issue, will continue. Perhaps the Court will leave the Auer deference
controversy alone for a while (although Gorsuch did warn that “this case hardly promises to be
this Court’s last word on Auer” 13). Even if it does, the § 706 issue could easily return to the Court
in a challenge to Chevron deference. Under Chevron, as most readers of this article are doubtless
aware, a reviewing court is generally expected to uphold an agency’s reasonable interpretation of
an ambiguous statute that the agency administers. 14 That standard obviously raises many of the
same questions about its consistency with § 706 that Auer deference does. Indeed, Gorsuch would
undoubtedly be more than willing to support an assault on Chevron deference, for he has long
proclaimed his antipathy for that doctrine, both as a lower court judge 15 and as a Justice. 16 Justice
Thomas has already suggested, post-Kisor, that Chevron deference “is likely contrary to the
APA.” 17 Moreover, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, in their separate opinions
in Kisor, pointedly stated that the outcome of that case had no implications for Chevron. 18 In
addition, the lower court bench is populated with more than a few additional deference skeptics
who might well take on this issue in anticipation of another Supreme Court encounter with it. 19
Against this background, the need for scholarly attention to the § 706 issue is manifest. At
the time of Kisor, the weight of scholarly opinion, at least in quantitative terms, was on Gorsuch’s
side. He was able to cite to many commentators who had given some degree of support to the de
11

Id. at 2424 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part).

12

Id.; see id. at 2414-18 (Kagan, J., for the Court).

13

Id. at 2448 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

14

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. For a more precise exegesis of the Chevron test, see infra Part III.

15

Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Kristen E.
Hickman, To Repudiate or Merely Curtail? Justice Gorsuch and Chevron Deference, 70 ALA. L. REV. 733 (2019)
(surveying Gorsuch’s lower court pronouncements on Chevron). Gorsuch’s opinion in Gutierrez-Brizuela was
reportedly a key factor in President Trump’s decision to appoint him to the Court. See, e.g., DAVID A. KAPLAN, THE
MOST DANGEROUS BRANCH: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT’S ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION 42 (2018) (“[W]hen
Gorsuch became a finalist for the Court, his opinion on Chevron deference proved decisive in clinching the
nomination”).
16

See, e.g, BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893, 908-09 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

17

United States v. Baldwin, 140 S. Ct. 690, 692 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

18

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part); id. at 2449 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the
judgment).
19

See, e.g, Egan v. Delaware River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 278-83 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., concurring in
the judgment); Raymond M. Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the
Bench, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 324 (2017); Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation
on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1348-49
(2018) (finding widespread distaste for Chevron in the regional courts of appeals, although not in the D.C. Circuit).

3
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novo reading of § 706. 20 Most of those authors had expounded that position only passingly or
with reservations, but others, most notably John Duffy and Aditya Bamzai, had defended it in
extended analyses. 21
At the same time, Kagan cited to only one article—by Cass Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule—to support her claim that § 706 does contemplate, or at least allow for, judicial
deference on legal issues. 22 Indeed, there were few, if any, other articles she could have cited. In
the wake of Kisor, Sunstein has expanded on his previous analysis in another article, 23 and Craig
Green has also written helpfully on the subject. 24 These treatments, however, are relatively brief.
In view of the deeply contested and ideologically charged nature of this controversy, I believe a
more comprehensive analysis of the manifold dimensions of this issue is needed, and this article
seeks to provide one.
That inquiry will show, I believe, that the “de novo” reading of § 706 is quite weak. With
due respect for those who have argued to the contrary, I propose to demonstrate that the nodeference thesis is deeply flawed, and many individual arguments that have been deployed to
support it are decidedly shaky. In a way, this conclusion should not be surprising, because for
20

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2433 n.49 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). A partial list of such commentators
(not identical with Gorsuch’s list) would include CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 707 & n.26 (2011);
Michael McConnell, Kavanaugh and the “Chevron Doctrine,” DEFINING IDEAS, July 30, 2018,
https://www.hoover.org/research/kavanaugh-and-chevron-doctrine; Ronald A. Cass, Vive La Deference?: Rethinking
the Balance Between Administrative and Judicial Discretion, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1294, 1313 (2015); Thomas W.
Merrill, Re-Reading Chevron, 70 DUKE L.J. 153, 1194 (2021); Jerry L. Mashaw, Rethinking Judicial Review of
Administrative Action: A Nineteenth Century Perspective, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2243 (2011); Jack M.
Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be
Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 788-89 (2010) [hereinafter Beermann, End the Experiment]; Elizabeth Garrett,
Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2640 (2003); Jonathan Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the
Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW.
U. L. REV. 1239, 1249 (2002); Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get
It, 10 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 1, 23-24 (1996); Cynthia A. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 473 & n.85 (1989).
21

John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113 (1998); Aditya Bamzai,
The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908 (2017) [hereinafter Bamzai,
Origins].
22

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2419, 2421 (plurality opinion) (citing Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The
Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 306, 308 (2017)). In this section of her opinion, Kagan also
cited to an article by Dean Manning to support one of her background premises. Id. at 2420 (citing John F. Manning,
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612,
635-36 (1996)). As is well known, however, Manning’s article as a whole is a classic statement of opposition to Auer
deference (which was then called Seminole Rock deference). See, e.g., Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S.
Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (disavowing his previous support for Auer deference, partly on the basis
of Manning’s analysis).
23
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1641-57 (2019) [hereinafter Sunstein, Chevron as
Law]. For a short, readable version of the portions of his article that are most relevant to the present article, see Cass
R. Sunstein, Chevron Is Not Inconsistent with the APA, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT, Sept. 16, 2020,
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-is-not-inconsistent-with-the-apa-by-cass-r-sunstein/.
24
Craig Green, Chevron Debates and the Constitutional Transformation of Administrative Law, 88 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 654, 676-94 (2020).

4
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more than seven decades the courts have regularly proceeded on the assumption that the first
sentence of § 706 imposes no real constraint on their decisionmaking. The revisionists, seeking to
overturn an APA interpretation that has prevailed in the courts since before any of them was born,
have a heavy burden to carry, and I will argue that they cannot come close to carrying it.
A distinctive feature of this particular issue is that, unlike many other aspects of the ongoing
debate over judicial deference, the APA argument can be discussed and evaluated on the basis of
conventional legal materials. Usually, controversies over Chevron and Auer deference implicate
fundamental disagreements about the appropriate scope, and even the legitimacy, of the regulatory
state. 25 Legal analysts frequently, and perhaps necessarily, bring their respective ideological
preferences to these discussions. I will contend, however, that the § 706 issue is, or ought to be,
different. It can and should depend on evidence—although, in the current politicized environment,
I would hesitate to predict that this article, or any other, will terminate all disputation over that
issue. 26
Part I of this article analyzes the Kagan and Gorsuch opinions in Kisor, using them as a
vehicle for framing with precision the scope and thrust of this article. Part II reviews the evidence,
contending that the text of § 706, related APA provisions, legislative history, case law background,
and contemporaneous understanding all fail to support the no-deference interpretation of § 706.
Of course, the proposition that § 706 does not forbid all judicial deference to agencies on
legal issues does not, standing alone, establish what sorts of deference the APA does allow. Over
the years, the provision has been applied in a variety of ways. Part III of the article explains why,
in my view, the Chevron doctrine, as currently applied, falls within the range of allowable
approaches.
I. Framing the Issue
At the outset, I will try to articulate with precision the interpretation of § 706 that the article
seeks to refute and the alternative that it will defend. To that end, I will focus on Kisor v. Wilkie,
in which Justices Kagan and Gorsuch set forth diametrically opposed interpretations of the first
sentence of § 706. First, consider Gorsuch’s perspective. He wrote that the first sentence of § 706
instructs reviewing courts to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “set aside agency
action . . . found to be . . . not in accordance with law.” Determining the meaning of a
statute or regulation, of course, presents a classic legal question. But in case these directives
were not clear enough, the APA further directs courts to “determine the meaning” of any
relevant “agency action,” including any rule issued by the agency. The APA thus requires
a reviewing court to resolve for itself any dispute over the proper interpretation of an
25

For an overview of the political and legal controversy, see Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930’s Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV L. REV. 1 (2017).
26

It has been argued that Chevron must be consistent with the APA, because it largely overlaps the deferential
standard of review codified in § 706(2)(A). Kristin E. Hickman & R. David Hahn, Categorizing Chevron, 81 OHIO
ST. L.J. 611, 656-69 (2020). As will be seen below, I agree with this analysis up to a point. See infra note 284 and
accompanying text. Before reaching that point, however, I will devote the bulk of this article to demonstrating that
the first sentence of § 706 poses no obstacle to that conclusion.

5
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agency regulation. A court that, in deference to an agency, adopts something other than the
best reading of a regulation isn’t “decid[ing]” the relevant “questio[n] of law” or
“determin[ing] the meaning” of the regulation. Instead, it’s allowing the agency to dictate
the answer to that question. 27
Notwithstanding his argumentative tone, Gorsuch’s explanation of the meaning of the
provision was straightforward: Section 706 flatly forbids deference to agency views on questions
of law, including the interpretation of regulations. As he went on to maintain, the APA’s
“unqualified command requires the court to determine legal questions—including questions about
a regulation’s meaning— by its own lights, not by those of political appointees or bureaucrats who
may even be self-interested in the case at hand.” 28
Arguably, the clarity of that stance is undercut by Gorsuch’s occasional approving
references to the competing review standard in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 29 Indeed, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, in their separate opinions in Kisor, claimed that they could see
little difference between Gorsuch’s and Kagan’s positions. Those statements are important as
expressions of the way in which they themselves would like Gorsuch’s opinion to be read, but one
can seriously doubt whether Gorsuch himself would agree. Skidmore, of course, is applied
differently in different jurists’ hands. 30 Gorsuch’s version seems to be one in which a court will
accept an agency’s interpretation only if it is persuaded by that position, which is a very faint form
of deference, if it can be called by that name at all. I will refrain from speculating about how this
dynamic among the Justices will play out over time. What seems abundantly clear, however, is
that nearly every page in Gorsuch’s concurrence exudes overt hostility to any incursions on a
reviewing court’s “independence” in its review of legal issues. For present purposes, therefore, it
seems safe to assume that Gorsuch intends to continue to propound the no-deference approach to
the APA, or at least that this attitude will be a factor to reckon with in the broader intellectual
debate.
Kagan’s interpretation of § 706 requires a somewhat fuller exegesis. She explained it as
follows:
[E]ven when a court defers to a regulatory reading, it acts consistently with Section
706. That provision does not specify the standard of review a court should use in
“determin[ing] the meaning” of an ambiguous rule. 5 U. S. C. §706. One possibility, as
Kisor says, is to review the issue de novo. But another is to review the agency’s reading
for reasonableness. . . . [W]e have long presumed (subject always to rebuttal) that the
Congress delegating regulatory authority to an agency intends as well to give that agency
considerable latitude to construe its ambiguous rules. . . . . Because of [that presumption,]

27

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2432 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

28

Id.

29

323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see, e.g., Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2428, 2447 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

30
See generally Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107
COLUM L. REV. 1235, 1250-71 (2007) (exploring how Skidmore is applied in various lower court opinions).

6
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courts do not violate Section 706 by applying Auer. To the contrary, they fulfill their duty
to “determine the meaning” of a rule precisely by deferring to the agency’s reasonable
reading. . . .
That is especially so given the practice of judicial review at the time of the APA’s
enactment. Section 706 was understood when enacted to “restate[] the present law as to the
scope of judicial review [citing the Attorney General’s Manual on the APA].” . . . We have
thus interpreted the APA not to “significantly alter the common law of judicial review of
agency action.” . . . That pre-APA common law included Seminole Rock itself (decided the
year before) along with prior decisions foretelling that ruling. Even assume that the
deference regime laid out in those cases had not yet fully taken hold. At a minimum,
nothing in the law of that era required all judicial review of agency interpretations to be de
novo. . . . And so nothing suggests that Section 706 imposes that requirement. 31
That Kagan rejected Gorsuch’s claim that § 706 requires de novo review is self-evident. But
several points concerning her alternative vision invite exploration.
First, one should not interpret her analysis as relying very heavily on a supposition that
Congress does, in fact, typically “intend” to grant agencies latitude to construe their own
regulations. Her “presumption” that it does was, although not entirely unprecedented, 32 a
relatively new framework for discussion of Auer deference. Historically, the Court has not chosen
to be explicit about the jurisprudential foundations for Auer deference, or for that matter Chevron
deference. Had the question been raised, the Court would probably have described these doctrines
as exercises of federal common law authority. Indeed, much of the corpus of administrative law
can be described as manifestations of “administrative common law.” 33
Kagan’s new approach was clearly modeled on the presumptions that the Court has
articulated in closely related contexts. Under Chevron, the courts will generally presume that
Congress intends for statutory ambiguities to be resolved by agencies in some reasonable

31

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2419-20 (plurality opinion).

32
In this regard, Kagan relied solely, see id. at 2412, on Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 151-53 (1991), in
which the Court held that, in a regulatory scheme in which one agency brings enforcement cases and a second agency
adjudicates them, courts should presume that Congress would prefer for the enforcement agency to be the one to which
the courts owe deference. The “presum[ption]” that some agency should receive deference was noted only briefly, as
it was not directly at issue. Id. at 151. Of course, the basic idea, not framed in terms of a presumption, had been
around for many decades.
33

Regarding the major role that administrative common law plays in regulatory cases, see, e.g., Gillian E.
Metzger, Foreword: Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1298-1304 (2012)
[hereinafter Metzger, Embracing]; Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5-26 (2011) [hereinafter Beermann, Common Law]; Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Common
Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 3, 6-10; Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten Administrative
Constitution, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1215, 1220, 1244-48 (2014). See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and
Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225 (1999) (encouraging judicial recognition of the interplay between statutes and the
common law).

7
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fashion; 34 and under United States v. Mead Corp., 35 they will also generally assume that this
congressional intention extends only to actions that an agency takes after a relatively formal
decisional process. 36 It has long been recognized (even by Professor Kagan) that these
presumptions are fictions, or at best unverified assertions. 37 Nevertheless, by the time of Kisor,
this somewhat artificial mode of analysis had become a familiar convention in judicial review
doctrine, and Kagan’s adoption of this rhetorical device in the Auer context was not very
surprising.
One can assume that the Court chooses to speak in “presumption” terms in these contexts
because it believes that they provide at least a patina of positive-law support for its
pronouncements on deference. As a practical matter, however, not much depends in this context
on whether the Court relies overtly on common-law precedents, or instead on presumptions that
largely rest on the same type of reasoning that had previously been reflected in those precedents. 38
The Court’s language about presumed congressional intent simply converts our inquiry into a
question of why the APA should be read to direct, or at least to allow, courts to apply that
presumption.
Second, one might get the impression from the above excerpt that, in Kagan’s view,
Congress directed reviewing courts to comply with Auer (or more accurately Seminole Rock).39
But that reading would surely be incorrect. To the contrary, she stated categorically that § 706
“does not specify the standard of review a court should use.” 40 She noted that “nothing in the law
of [the pre-1946] era required all judicial review of agency interpretations to be de novo.” 41 It
follows, she continued, that “nothing suggests that Section 706 imposes that requirement.” 42 In
short, her emphasis was on what the statute permits, not what it requires. Thus, the Auer principle
(or presumption) was a permissible approach, but not the only one the statute would allow.

34
See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (dictum); Util. Air Reg. Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302,
315 (2014); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013); Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S.
735, 740-41 (1996).
35

533 U.S. 218 (2001).

36

Id. at 229-30.

37

Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1876 (2015) (compiling
authorities); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 212-25;
Beermann, End the Experiment, supra note 20, at 796-97 n.64; Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517.
38

Beermann, Common Law, supra note 33, at 3 (noting practical equivalency between overt common law and
creative statutory interpretation); Davis, supra note 33, at 4-5 (same); Metzger, Embracing, supra note 33, at 1295,
1310-11 (same).
39
See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2419 (plurality opinion) (courts “fulfill their duty to ‘determine the meaning’ of a rule
by deferring to the agency’s reasonable reading”) (quoting Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 22, at 306).
40

Id.

41

Id. at 2420.

42

Id.
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Third, implicit in the foregoing reasoning was an assumption that the APA maintains
continuity with the past but also leaves room for the case law to evolve over time. On the one
hand, the opinion presupposes a heritage of prior administrative practice—indeed, it claims that
the Act does not “significantly alter the common law of judicial review of agency action.” 43 On
the other hand, the opinion assumes that, by stating principles of judicial review at a high level of
generality, Congress avoided using language that would obligate courts to adhere indefinitely to
the specific principles prevailing in the 1940s. 44 Indeed, Kagan’s recognition of the openended
nature of the APA is the best way to make sense of Part II.B. of her opinion, 45 in which she “[took]
the opportunity to restate, and somewhat expand on, [the] principles [of Auer] here to clear up
some mixed messages we have sent.” 46 Although there is some debate about the extent to which
this section of the opinion revamped Auer deference, 47 it does seem clear that her account of the
doctrine emphasized its limitations to a greater extent than most past cases had done.
Moreover, Kagan’s conception of an evolving § 706 is consistent with the way that courts
have generally interpreted that section, as well as other provisions in the APA. 48 Indeed, much of
modern administrative law, nominally attributed to § 706, is in fact entirely different from the law
of 1946. The drafters of the Act certainly did not anticipate, for example, that courts would review
regulations on the basis of a rulemaking record, nor that they would evaluate those rules using a
“hard look.” 49

43

Id. (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)). Most commentators at the time of the Act’s
enactment saw § 706 as largely, if not entirely, compatible with preexisting common law. See infra Part II.F.2.
44

A contemporaneous author expressed the basic idea aptly:
Section 10 [now § 706] . . . does no more than to collect existing broad principles of law, with no
apparent change, restatement, or clarification. To those who argue that even so, it is well to “freeze” the law
as respects judicial review of administrative action, one can only ask the extent to which anything is “frozen.”
Such terms as “arbitrary,” “capricious,” “abuse of discretion,” “substantial evidence,” “prejudicial error,”
and the like mean now as before just what courts say that they mean; and there is no assurance that either
judicial expressions or concepts of today will be identical with those of yesterday or to-morrow.

Homer A. Walkup, Note, The Administrative Procedure Act, 34 GEO. L.J. 457, 475 (1947).
45

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414-18 (opinion of the Court).

46

Id. at 2414.

47

Compare Aaron L. Nielson, Kisor Deference, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT, June 26, 2019,
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/kisor-deference/ (“the version of ‘Auer’ that the Court created today [in Kisor] is so far
removed from how Auer was understood yesterday that isn’t really accurate to call it Auer anymore”), with Ronald
Levin, Auer deference — Supreme Court chooses evolution, not revolution, SCOTUSBLOG, June 27, 2019,
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/symposium-auer-deference-supreme-court-chooses-evolution-not-revolution/
(“Kagan’s arguments are ones that have been embraced by judges for decades”).
48

See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1389 (1996); Alan B.
Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253 (1986).
49

Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial
Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 754-55 (1975)
(finding “not the slightest indication that the purpose of the notice-and-comment proceeding was to develop a record”);
James V. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257, 259 (1979) (“In
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Some scholars have criticized the trends in administrative law that underlie Kagan’s model.
For example, an article by John Duffy expresses deep skepticism about the legitimacy and
desirability of common law reasoning in judicial review of agency action. 50 In his view, the APA
sets forth a “comprehensive” scheme for judicial review. 51 He argues that courts have too often
flouted the APA by developing judicial review doctrines creatively, without specific reference to
the statutory text. 52 Because he reads § 706 as mandating de novo review of legal issues, Duffy
regards Chevron as a prime example of such judicial overreaching.
In my view, Duffy overstates the extent to which the APA is incompatible with judicial
review doctrines rooted in common law reasoning. Indeed, § 559 of the APA states that the Act
“does not limit or repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by
law.” 53 Other authors have spelled out reasons why common law doctrines on judicial review are
legitimate and, as a practical matter, unavoidable. 54 I will not undertake to replicate their work
here. Indeed, in this article I rely entirely on the methodology and conventions of statutory
interpretation—although, as I said earlier, the line that divides statutory interpretation from overt
common law reasoning is often blurry and for many purposes inconsequential. Regardless, in
subsequent sections I will respond to Duffy’s principal arguments that relate specifically to
interpretation of § 706.
In an even more iconoclastic vein, a handful of scholars have taken “originalist”
conceptions in a different direction, by broadly calling into question the legitimacy of the evolving
nature of APA interpretation. 55 I hope to explore this line of argument in a future paper. For the
present, I will not dwell on that thesis, because it has no real support outside of academic circles.
I very much doubt that Justice Gorsuch, or advocacy groups that favor the “de novo” reading of §
706, would have much sympathy for that approach, because it would be quite unsettling, and, more
importantly, because their underlying objective is to subject administrative agencies to greater
discipline and accountability, not to relax the safeguards that courts have heretofore read into the
Act. Accordingly, I presume that Gorsuch and his allies are not opposed in principle to the concept
of an evolving APA – rather, they simply think that the first sentence of § 706 imposes a duty of
“independent” inquiry that courts have long neglected and should now heed.

the past decades the federal courts of appeals have reshaped the structure of informal rulemaking in a series of
decisions expanding both the obligations of agencies and the role of the reviewing courts.”).
50

Duffy, supra note 21.

51

See id. at 130.

52

Id. at 141-46. With admirable candor, Duffy provides a thorough discussion of authorities that have endorsed
the “New Common Law” that he deplores. Id. at 131-38.
53

5 U.S.C. § 559 (emphasis added); see Davis, supra note 33, at 10-11 (emphasizing § 559).

54
See Metzger, Embracing, supra note 33, at 1320-52; Beermann, Common Law, supra note 33, at 26-28; Davis,
supra note 33, at 5-7.
55

Evan D. Bernick, Envisioning Administrative Procedure Act Originalism, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 807 (2018);
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852 (2020); Kathryn E. Kovacs,
Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207 (2015).
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Against this background, my basic claim in this article will be that the first sentence of
§ 706 supports Kagan’s flexible approach, and that Gorsuch’s no-deference reading is erroneous.
II. Evaluating the De Novo Interpretation
A. Does the First Sentence Have Operative Effect At All?
In his concurring opinion in Kisor v. Wilkie, 56 Justice Gorsuch found it “remarkabl[e]” that
“until today this Court has never made any serious effort to square the Auer doctrine with the
APA. 57 An explanation for that silence could be that many administrative lawyers have doubted
that the first sentence of § 706 was designed to be particularly important—and they have had good
reasons for doubting it. When one reads the entire section on its face, the introductory sentence
looks like a sort of warmup introduction—a passage that merely identifies some of the kinds of
questions that would fall within a court’s domain, while the six numbered categories listed in §
706(2) perform the more crucial work of identifying the grounds for review of such questions.
Specifically, these latter categories address questions of law by stating that a reviewing court must
hold an agency action unlawful if it is “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,
or short of statutory right” under subsection (2)(C) or “not in accordance with law” under
subsection (2)(A). Neither of these latter provisions comes even close to expressing the kind of
prohibition on deference that Justice Gorsuch discerned in the opening sentence. 58
This interpretation of the design of § 706 helps to explain why some of the participants in
the deliberations leading up to the Act appeared to pay no particular attention to the first sentence.
For example, the “committee print” published by the Senate Judiciary Committee in June 1945
summarized the draft provision that would become § 706 by mentioning its “several categories,”
without mentioning the opening sentence at all. 59 During the House proceedings, Representative
Springer, a member of the Judiciary Committee, presented a lengthy and evidently carefully
prepared discussion of the same provision. He devoted one or more paragraphs to each of the six
subcategories in what is now § 706(2), but said nothing about the first sentence. 60 The floor
comments of Representative Gwynne, also a Judiciary Committee member, were similar, although
briefer. He mentioned the specific review standards but not the “decide all relevant questions of
56

139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).

57

Id. at 2432 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

58

Professor Duffy appears to read § 706(2)(C) more restrictively: “Deference ends when a limitation of law is
reached. This is reinforced by § 706(2)(C), which mandates overturning agency actions ‘in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right’ without any suggestion of deference.” Duffy, supra
note 21, at 194 n.140. On its face, however, the clause is worded neutrally. Although, as Duffy says, the clause does
not prescribe deference, he cites no support for his apparent belief that it prohibits such deference.
59

S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (Committee
Print 1945) [hereinafter SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT], reprinted in S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 11, 39 (1946) [hereinafter APA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY]. The published legislative history of the APA is available online at https://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/
administrative-procedure-act-pl-79-404.
60
92 CONG. REC. 5657 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 376-78 (remarks of
Rep. Springer).
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law” language. 61 I do not want to put too much weight on the negative implications that appear to
emanate from these fragments of legislative history. However, as will be seen, the legislative
history is bereft of any good affirmative support for Justice Gorsuch’s interpretation of § 706, and
in that context, these negative implications are at least suggestive as to the legislators’ thinking.
A related point is that the words “decide” and “determine” are not the only ambiguous
terms in the first sentence of § 706. The term “questions of law” is not self-defining, either. As
recently as 2020, the Supreme Court has recognized that judicial review statutes sometimes use
that phrase to encompass not only what might be called “purely legal” questions, but also so-called
“mixed questions of law and fact.” 62 Some of the participants in deliberations over the APA
appeared to use the phrase “questions of law” in a similarly broad sense. 63 Yet these broad
definitions would obviously be difficult to reconcile with any theory that all “questions of law”
must be reviewed de novo. 64 Again, these intimations in the legislative history are too sparse to
support any firm conclusion that the drafters of the APA contemplated this usage. At the very
least, however, the ambiguity that surrounds this elusive term in the first sentence of § 706 counsels
against drawing any hasty conclusions about the supposed commands of that sentence.
In subsequent years, judges who have applied the APA have also sometimes appeared to
regard the meaning of the first sentence of § 706 as a nonissue. A good illustration is the 1971
decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 65 one of the most familiar and
influential cases in the administrative law canon. Justice Marshall, in his opinion for the Court,
wrote that “the existence of judicial review is only the start: the standard for review must also be
determined. For that we must look to § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides
that a ‘reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found’ not to meet six separate standards.” 66 He then proceeded to survey the six
61

92 CONG. REC. 5656 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 375 (remarks of Rep.
Gwynne). See also Allen Moore, The Proposed Administrative Procedure Act, 22 DICTA 1, 14 (1945), reprinted in
APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 327, 335 (quoting verbatim the language that would become § 706(2),
which he called the “essential words” of the provision, and adding that “[e]very clause, phrase and word of this
quotation deserves extensive and intensive study to determine its true significance,” but ignoring the language that
would become the first sentence of § 706).
62

Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1068-69 (2020). See generally Ronald M. Levin, Identifying
Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 9-12 (1985) [hereinafter Levin, Identifying Questions of Law]
(describing longstanding uncertainty about how the term should be interpreted).
63

See SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 39 (“Subsection (e) [now §
706], therefore, seeks merely to restate the several categories of questions of law subject to judicial review”); Pat
McCarran, Improving “Administrative Justice”: Hearings and Evidence; Scope of Judicial Review, 32 A.B.A.J. 827,
893 (1946) (“[T]he Act expressly provides . . . that every recognized type of question of law—including supporting
evidence for findings upon which agency action rests—shall be subject to judicial review”) (footnotes omitted).
Compare Justice Scalia’s formulation quoted infra note 73 and accompanying text.
64

See Levin, Identifying Questions of Law, supra note 62, at 5-6 (contending that the so-called Bumpers
Amendment, a legislative proposal that would have expressly added “de novo” to the first sentence of § 706, would
have proved unmanageably broad and destructive if “questions of law” were construed to include mixed questions).
65

401 U.S. 402 (1971).

66

Id. at 414 (citation omitted).
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categories, making no mention at all of the first sentence of § 706. 67 Moreover, as recently as
1998, Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB 68 that
“[s]ubstantive review of an agency’s interpretation of its regulations is governed only by that
general provision of the Administrative Procedure Act which requires courts to set aside agency
action that is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.’” 69 He said nothing about the opening sentence of § 706. Against the background of this
body of administrative law opinion, the Court’s failure to have examined the first sentence of § 706
closely does not seem so “remarkable.”
I myself think that much can be said for the long-held assumption that the first sentence of
§ 706 was not intended to, and should not, play a significant role in judicial review proceedings.
However, the evidence that I have just reviewed is rather sparse. More importantly, one cannot be
sure that the Court would be receptive to this theory, and I doubt that this article should put too
much weight on the expectation that it would be. In the remainder of Part II, therefore, I will
proceed from the working assumption that the first sentence might well have operative effect, and
I will examine the various arguments for and against the de novo interpretation of that sentence.
B. Textual Implications: “Decide” and “Determine”
According to Justice Gorsuch, when the first sentence of § 706 instructs the reviewing court
to “decide” questions of law and “determine” the meaning of an agency action, it means that the
court’s ruling must be de novo. He was right when he pointed out that quite a few commentators
have said that the APA at least seems to carry this meaning. 70 Although, in some instances, the
statements to which he referred were somewhat more qualified or fleeting than he acknowledges,
one can agree that, when considered in the abstract, this is a plausible interpretation of the sentence.
At the same time, the statutory sentence is by no means unambiguous. It has no “plain
meaning.” After all, the past seventy-five years’ experience with the Act demonstrates that the
meaning that Justice Gorsuch discerns in the words of § 706 was not at all “plain” to three
generations of judges. Presumably, virtually all of them thought, or at least assumed, that they
were “deciding” questions of law and “determining” the meaning of agency actions in a manner
that the APA allowed. Many of them may have understood it to mean that they should decide
questions of law in a manner that would resemble, or at least grow out of, the manner in which
courts had been deciding such questions when the Act was adopted—which certainly entailed a
measure of deference to agencies’ interpretations. That too is a plausible interpretation of the Act.
Indeed, I will argue that it is correct. Although I think the revisionist interpretation of § 706 that
67

Id. at 414-15. Justice Marshall must have been aware of the first sentence of § 706, because he quoted the
section in full in a footnote accompanying this discussion. Id. at 414 n.30.
68

522 U.S. 359 (1998).

69
Id. at 377 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754 (1979) (suggesting that, in
an APA case, an agency’s violation of its procedural regulation may be redressed under § 706(2)(A) or § 706(2)(D),
but not mentioning the first sentence of the section).
70
See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (listing commentators who have spoken favorably about this
interpretation).
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Justice Gorsuch and his allies have propounded is audacious enough, any contention that the APA
“plainly” requires de novo review would compound that audacity.
Justice Scalia, who was well known as a careful reader of texts, did not think the words of
§ 706 were self-explanatory. In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Mead Corp. 71 in 2001,
he raised the question of what the language did mean. “There is some question whether Chevron
was faithful to the text of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which it did not even bother
to cite.” 72 He quoted the “decide all relevant questions of law” language from the statute and
mused that it “would seem to mean that all statutory ambiguities are to be resolved judicially. It
could be argued, however, that the legal presumption identified by Chevron left as the only
‘questio[n] of law’ whether the agency’s interpretation had gone beyond the scope of discretion
that the statutory ambiguity conferred.” 73 By 2015, amid his growing reservations about judicial
deference, he found himself lamenting that the Court had propounded deference doctrines
“[h]eedless of the original design of the APA.” 74 The ambivalence in these pronouncements at
different points in his judicial career is apparent, but at least they suggest that he did not think that
the language of the Act, standing alone, could resolve these issues.
Even if we make the assumption that the first sentence of § 706 does not have a “plain
meaning,” it does contain language that invites exploration. More specifically, Justice Gorsuch
defended his interpretation of the word “determine” by offering several specific arguments based
on the text of the sentence, and these arguments deserve discussion.
For one thing, he argued, cases applying Auer have held that “even after one court has
spoken on a regulation’s meaning, . . . an agency is always free to adopt a different view and insist
on judicial deference to its new judgment.” 75 Such holdings, he said, deprive the first court’s
interpretation of “the force that normally attaches to precedent.” Under these circumstances, he
asked, “how can anyone honestly say the court, rather than the agency, ever really ‘determine[s]’
what the regulation means?” 76 As he explained, these assumed implications of Auer can be traced
back to the Court’s 2005 decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Services. 77 Under Brand X, when a court has upheld one interpretation of an ambiguous
statute, an agency can later adopt a different reading of the statute and receive Chevron deference

71

533 U.S. 218 (2001).

72

Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

73

Id. at 241 n.2. See also infra note 137 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Scalia’s remark that APA
drafters who assumed that “questions of law would always be decided de novo by the courts” were “quite mistaken”).
74

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 109 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

75

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2433 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

76

Id.

77

545 U.S. 967 (2005).
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for that interpretation. 78 Lower courts have applied the same basic principle to interpretations of
regulations. 79
The analysis in Kagan’s opinion suggests a straightforward answer to Gorsuch’s argument:
The term “determine” in § 706 can be understood to mean that a court should make its
determination according to prevailing principles of administrative law. In this instance, the
holding of Brand X constitutes one of those principles; the case itself specifies “the force that
normally attaches to precedent.” This inference from Kagan’s opinion corresponds, in substance,
to the way in which reviewing courts have in fact applied Brand X for the past fifteen years in the
Chevron context. To be sure, Justice Gorsuch has made clear for several years that he himself
disapproves of Brand X. 80 But it has by now become a recognized part of administrative law.81
So long as it remains in effect, I do not think Justice Gorsuch’s lament adds any special weight to
his interpretation of § 706. 82
Continuing, Justice Gorsuch derided the plurality’s interpretation of “determine” in § 706
by asking what would happen if it were extended to the limit of its logic. What if a court’s statutory
duty to “determine” a criminal sentence, or to “determine” whether a proposed settlement in a civil
antitrust suit is in the public interest, were construed to mean that the court must accept any
reasonable view the government proposes? 83 If the APA were a newly enacted statute, such
warnings about floodgates might be credible. But we have had decades of experience in which
courts have interpreted the APA in roughly the manner that Kagan advocates. They have never
had difficulty with the concept that the word “determine” (or “decide”) in § 706 can be applied
differently in varying contexts. In that light, Justice Gorsuch’s tendentious hypotheticals do not
seem fearsome.
Then he offered another reductio ad absurdum argument: “If it were really true that the
APA has nothing to say about how courts decide what regulations mean, then it would follow that
the APA tolerates a rule that ‘the government is always right.’” 84 One might again reply by simply
78

Id. at 982-84. Gorsuch somewhat exaggerated the holding of Brand X, which does not come into play if the
prior court found that the text being interpreted was unambiguous, or if the agency’s subsequent interpretation is
unreasonable. For present purposes, however, I will ignore those qualifications, which have no direct bearing on the
issue that Gorsuch raised.
79

See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2433 n.51 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

80

Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1132, 1150-51 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). More
recently, Justice Thomas, the author of Brand X, has disavowed his previous support for that case (and for Chevron
itself). Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 690-95 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
81

See, e.g., United States v. Eurodif, S.A., 555 U.S. 305 (2009); Szonyi v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th
Cir. 2019); Acosta v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 909 F.3d 723, 731 (5th Cir. 2018); Medina-Nunez v. Lunch, 788
F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 312 (3d Cir. 2014); Metropolitan Hosp. v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 712 F.3d 248, 255-56 (6th Cir. 2013).
82

In a statutory context, the same reasoning could be used to explain how courts can apply Brand X without
contravening the § 706 directive to “decide all relevant questions of law.”
83

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2433-34 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

84

Id. at 2434.
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saying that this farfetched scenario has never come to pass. On another level, however, the
challenge implicit in Gorsuch’s gibe does seem rather fair. In effect, it frames up the question of
whether, indeed, § 706 is completely unbounded.
Upon reflection, however, that question isn’t difficult. I noted above that the APA
presupposes a common law background. 85 Concomitantly, subsequent elaborations on its judicial
review requirements must bear at least a reasonable relationship to prevailing principles as of 1946.
Modern judicial review principles—including the Chevron doctrine, as I will discuss below 86—do
meet that rather lenient test, but Justice Gorsuch’s hypothetical “anything goes” standard of review
obviously does not. A regime in which courts may not review agency legal interpretations at all
would be fundamentally incompatible with administrative practice as of the time of the APA, as
the advocates of de novo review are among the first to insist.87 And we needn’t even look at that
history, because the text of the statute also belies that interpretation: A “government is always
right” standard of review would hardly be compatible with the APA’s explicit provision for
judicial review of statutory issues in § 706(2)(C).
C. Surrounding Text
If, as the preceding section maintained, the language of the first sentence of § 706 does not,
when read in isolation, justify a conclusion that judicial review of questions of law must be de
novo, shorn of deference, we can go on to ask whether the context of the statute sheds any light on
that issue. A standard step in statutory interpretation methodology, particularly favored by
textualists, 88 is to look to related provisions in the same Act. Statutory interpretation is, in other
words, a holistic endeavor. 89 On the other hand, inferences based on the interrelationship of
various parts of a statute are, by their nature, only indirect evidence, so arguments of this nature
need to be evaluated critically.
One of Gorsuch’s arguments falls into this category. He wrote that the legislature “knew
perfectly well how to require judicial deference when it wished—in fact Congress repeatedly
specified deferential standards for judicial review elsewhere in the statute,” 90 in contrast to its
supposed mandate that courts must “determine” the meaning of regulations without deference. As
examples of such deferential standards, he cited to clause (2)(A) (“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”) and clause (2)(E) (unsupported by
substantial evidence in [specified cases].” But how, exactly, does Justice Gorsuch know that these
clauses require deference? Their language does not clearly say so. The reason he knows this, of
85

See supra Part I.

86

See infra Part III.

87

See infra Part II.E.2.

88

ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 167-69 (2012)

89

Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (2019) (plurality opinion); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo
Nordisk, 566 U.S. 399, 412 (2012); Wash. State Dep’t of Social & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler,
537 U.S. 371, 384 n.7 (2003).
90

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2432-33 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
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course, is that he recognizes the legal context in which these terms of art have long been
understood. 91 Such context is a perfectly appropriate source of guidance on such an interpretive
issue. By the same token, the APA terms “decide” and “determine” should not be evaluated in a
vacuum, either.
Moreover, Gorsuch did not mention clause (2)(C) in this connection. As I noted above,
there is a fair argument that clauses (2)(A) and (2)(C) overlap the first sentence of the section (as
Gorsuch reads it). 92 Thus, instead of revealing a meaningful contrast among the categories of §
706(2), a holistic reading of the section casts doubt on whether its first sentence prescribes a
standard of review for legal issues at all.
Meanwhile, an entirely separate holistic argument that supposedly favors the “de novo”
interpretation of § 706 focuses on the fact that its first sentence directs a reviewing court to
“interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.” Thus, the argument runs, since everyone takes
for granted that judicial review of constitutional interpretations is nondeferential, 93 the statute must
contemplate that judicial review of agencies’ statutory interpretations will also be nondeferential.
Although Justice Gorsuch did not rely on this argument in Kisor, Justice Thomas mentioned it
briefly in a recent solo opinion. 94 Several scholars have also seemed to take the argument
seriously. 95 Usually, these references are very fleeting, but Aditya Bamzai seems particularly fond
of the argument, having relied on it in multiple articles. 96 For present purposes, therefore, I will
call it the Bamzai argument.
91

Actually, Justice Gorsuch’s characterization of the language of § 706(2) was an overgeneralization at best. I
have already mentioned that, according to Allentown, the validity of a regulation is assessed under § 706(2)(A), and
obviously Gorsuch doesn’t think that such review should be deferential. Another difficulty with his observation is
that the dividing line between legal review and review for abuse of discretion is not always sharp. For example, the
leading case on § 706(2)(A) states that “an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if [inter alia] the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). But that test essentially requires an inquiry into congressional intent, so it has
more in common with other “questions of law” than with the other inquiries prescribed elsewhere in § 706(2)(A).
See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Glen Staszewski, Judicial Review of Agency Discretion, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND
POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 195, 200 (Michael E. Herz et al. eds., 2d ed. 2015) [hereinafter ABA
JUDICIAL REVIEW GUIDE] (“The caselaw often describes this ground [reliance on improper factors as defined by law]
as an element of the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ test, although it seems more properly understood as a component of the
court’s legal analysis.”)
What this example illustrates is that administrative law doctrine on the scope of review of agency action is
far too complex and nuanced to be fully captured within the spare language of § 706. That is why, as I remarked
above, interpretation of that provision in light of a substantial common law gloss is not only historically well justified
(as this article argues), but also a practical necessity. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
92

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

93

But cf. Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2016) (arguing that courts
should defer to judgments of agencies on procedural due process issues). For a critique of that article, see Ronald M.
Levin, Administrative Procedure and Judicial Restraint, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 338 (2016).
94

United States v. Baldwin, 140 S. Ct. 690, 692 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

95

See Duffy, supra note 21, at 194; Farina, supra note 20, at 473 n.85.

96

See, e.g., Bamzai, Origins, supra note 21, at 985; Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion:
Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 194 (2019); Aditya
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In my view, the argument is flawed on multiple grounds. It reads too much into a
juxtaposition that could easily mean nothing more than what the statute actually says: The
reviewing court “shall interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,” but not necessarily in the
same manner. After all, it is not hard to find other provisions in the APA that contain manifestly
unrelated terms that evidently have been brought together for drafting convenience but have never
been thought to call for parallel interpretations above and beyond what the text itself provides.97
The very next sentence of § 706 is one example. The various clauses of § 706(2) combine legal
and factual issues, but obviously courts apply them using a variety of review standards. Indeed,
clauses (B) and (C) of that subsection separate the very issues that Bamzai’s argument would
conflate.
Actually, one could turn the Bamzai argument on its head by arguing that the same
methodology supports the plurality’s position in Kisor. The terms “arbitrary,” “capricious,” and
“abuse of discretion” are deferential standards. Does this mean that the phrase “not in accordance
with law,” which is found in the same statutory clause, and which is the basis for judicial review
of regulatory interpretations according to Allentown Mack, 98 triggers a similar level of deference?
If so, Auer deference must be valid after all! The argument is tempting, but I will resist temptation
and adhere to my central point: The evidence underlying the argument based on juxtaposition is
not probative.
Finally, on a substantive level, the Bamzai argument appears to prove too much. As
thoughtful commentators have argued, judicial review of constitutional issues is similar in some
ways to judicial review of statutory issues, but in other ways these inquiries stem from different
traditions and serve different purposes. 99 Some of these authors’ theories may be well taken and
others less so, but the assumption that Congress casually overrode all such differences and
prescribed uniformity between constitutional review and statutory review is counterintuitive, and
courts have understandably avoided holding that the APA requires such an equation. Yet, if the
parallel construction in the phrase “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions” requires equal
degrees of judicial deference in these two contexts, why would it not erase other distinctions as
Bamzai, Justice Scalia and the Evolution of Chevron Deference, 21 TEX. REV. OF L. & POL. 295, 300 (2017). See also
Aditya Bamzai, Henry Hart’s Brief, Frank Murphy’s Draft, and the Seminole Rock Opinion, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE
& COMMENT, Sept. 12, 2016, https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/henry-harts-brief-frank-murphys-draft-and-the-seminolerock-opinion-by-aditya-bamzai/ (extending the argument to the entire first sentence of § 706, so that it applies to
interpretations of regulations as well).
97

See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (providing a rulemaking exemption for matters relating to “agency management
or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts”; id. § 553(b)(A) (providing that notice and
comment obligations do not apply to “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice”); id. § 554(d) (providing an exemption from separation of function requirements
for initial licensing applications, rate proceedings, and agency heads); id. § 557(b) (providing that a recommended
decision “in rule making or determining initial applications for licenses” need not be made by an administrative law
judge).
98

See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.

99

See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. COLO. L. REV.
1 passim (2004); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 889 (1996);
Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744-45 (1982).
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well? The absence of a logical stopping point in Bamzai’s argument tends to indicate that the
effort to extract guidance from the parallelism is not well founded in the first place. 100
D. Legislative History
Another source of potentially illuminating data regarding the meaning of § 706 is the record
of congressional deliberations on the Act. In examining that record, we will need to keep in mind
the usual caveats about reliance on legislative history. One hazard is that advocates have a
propensity to cherry-pick the quotes that best serve their own side in the interpretive dispute. A
well-known quip by Judge Harold Leventhal sums up the problem: The use of legislative history
is “the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for
one’s friends.” 101
Moreover, one cannot rule out the possibility that some of the quotes were deliberately
uttered for the purpose of giving the impression that Congress as a whole subscribed to positions
that were only the views of a few. Although we now associate skepticism about legislative history
documents with Justice Scalia’s longtime crusade against judicial reliance on them, doubts about
the reliability of the APA’s legislative history in particular have a much longer vintage.
Immediately after the Act was adopted—when the future Justice Scalia was still in elementary
school—Alfred Conard published a critique that claimed that legislative and executive actors had
each sought to sprinkle the legislative history of the Act with language favoring their respective
interests. 102 As illustrations, he pointed to disagreements between the Attorney General and
members of Congress regarding the effect of the Act on the availability of judicial review. 103
Notwithstanding these cautionary admonitions, proponents of the de novo interpretation of
§ 706 have frequently invoked the legislative history of the APA in support of their cause. Thus,
100
Looking further afield, Professor Duffy has suggested that Chevron review is foreclosed by § 9(a) of the APA,
which, as codified, provides that “[a] sanction may not be imposed or a substantive rule or order issued except within
jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 558(b); see Duffy, supra note 21, at 198.
On its face, however, this provision is irrelevant to the issue of judicial deference. It merely states the self-evident
proposition that an agency must not act in excess of its jurisdiction or authority. Nothing in its legislative history
indicates that Congress intended it to be any less banal than it seems to be. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 25 (1945)
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT], reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 185, 211 (declaring, not
very surprisingly, that “[a]n agency authorized to regulate trade practices may not regulate banking, and so on.
Similarly, no agency may undertake directly or indirectly to exercise the functions of some other agency.”); H.R. REP.
NO. 79-1980, at 40 (1946) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 233, 274
(same). Section 558(b) is silent about the standard of review by which a court should determine the scope of the
agency’s jurisdiction or authority; nor does it say that the jurisdiction or authority must be conferred expressly rather
than implicitly. Indeed, the provision is addressed to agencies, not to courts.
101

Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Leventhal).

102

Alfred Conard, New Ways to Write Laws, 56 YALE L.J. 458, 461 & n.13 (1947).

103

Specifically, the Attorney General contended that the Act did not expand existing rights to judicial review,
and statutory preclusion could be implicit rather than explicit; legislators took issue with both contentions. Id. The
Attorney General’s predictions have been borne out with regard to the second issue but not the first. See Block v.
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1984) (finding implied preclusion under § 701(a)(1)); Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1971) (interpreting § 702 in a manner that liberalized the law
of standing).
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I do not think I can ignore this dimension of the interpretive challenge. In fact, I propose to show
that the legislative history supports the analysis that I have been advancing in the preceding pages.
1. The APA as a restatement
At the Kisor cocktail party, Justice Kagan’s best “friend” proved to be a statement in the
Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, 104 an explanatory document that
the Department of Justice published in 1947. Kagan noted that the Court “gives some deference
to the Manual ‘because of the role played by the Department of Justice in drafting the
legislation.’” 105 In this instance, she quoted the manual’s assertion that § 706 “was understood
when enacted to ‘restat[e] the present law as to the scope of judicial review.” 106
Initially, one may be inclined to mistrust the manual because of the very risk that Conard
and others have warned about: The Attorney General had client agencies and could be expected
to have preferred interpretations of the Act that would tend to favor his clients. Under orthodox
statutory construction principles, one would think that—if legislative history is to count at all—
explanatory material emanating from internal legislative sources should carry more weight than
the potentially self-serving explanations of a representative of the very entities that the Act was
meant to regulate. Justice Gorsuch drew attention to this concern, echoing some of the modern
commentators who favor the no-deference interpretation of § 706. 107
The fact remains, however, that the Court has frequently relied on the Attorney General’s
manual in APA cases. 108 It’s unlikely that the Court has never noticed the tension between this
practice and its usual statutory interpretation premises. Probably, one major reason for the practice
is that, in the Court’s view, the department’s interpretations deserve special weight because of the
thought and care that went into the manual’s preparation, as well as the executive branch’s
responsibility for putting the Act into practice. In other words, the Court’s high regard for the
Attorney General’s manual may stem from some of same factors that underlie the doctrine of
judicial deference to agencies’ statutory interpretations. It maps closely onto Justice Cardozo’s
well-known comment that judicial deference “has peculiar weight when it involves a
104

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947)
[hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL], available at https://fall.fsulawrc.com/admin/.
105
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2419 (plurality opinion) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978)).
106

Id. (quoting the ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 104, at 108).

107

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2436 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment); Duffy, supra note 21, at 132, 133-34;
Beermann, End the Experiment, supra note 20, at 790; George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative
Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1682-83 (1996).
108

See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 US 55, 63 (2004) (Scalia, J., for a unanimous Court)
(calling the manual “a document whose reasoning we have often found persuasive,” and citing Darby v. Cisneros, 509
U. S. 137, 148 n.10 (1993); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979); and Vermont Yankee, 435 U.
S. at 546); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 US 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling the manual
“the Government’s own most authoritative interpretation of the APA, which we have repeatedly given great weight”
(citation omitted), and citing Chrysler, Vermont Yankee, and Steadman v. SEC, 450 U. S. 91, 103, n.22 (1981)); K.M.
Lewis, Text(Plus Other Stuff)ualism: Textualists’ Perplexing Use of the Attorney General’s Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 287, 296-300 (2012).
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contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its
machinery in motion; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried
and new.” 109
I will not linger on this theoretical point, however, because in this instance the Attorney
General’s reading was supported not only by his own comments during the legislative debates, 110
but also by a passage in the committee print published in 1945 by the Senate Judiciary Committee:
A restatement of the scope of judicial review, as set forth in subsection (e) [now § 706], is
obviously necessary lest the proposed statute be taken as limiting or unduly expanding
judicial review. … It is not possible to specify all instances in which judicial review may
operate. Subsection (e), therefore, seeks merely to restate the several categories of
questions of law subject to judicial review. 111
The importance of this passage to the present discussion should be apparent. The term
“restatement” – in contrast to, say, “codification” – implies a congressional acknowledgement that
the courts had been, and could remain, the traditional norm-definers in this area. 112 The goal of

109

Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933). Compare Justice Frankfurter’s
caustic assessment of congressional rhetoric, during debates on the APA, regarding the courts’ supposed abuses of
substantial evidence review in NLRB cases: “No doubt some, perhaps even much, of the criticism was baseless and
some surely was reckless.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 478 (1951). Here the Court cited to an
article that had concluded “after an extensive investigation that ‘the denunciations find no support in fact.’” Id. at 478
n.6 (citing Walter Gellhorn & Seymour L. Linfield, Politics and Labor Relations: An Appraisal of Criticisms of NLRB
Procedure, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 339, 394 (1939)). See also Alfred Long Scanlan, Judicial Review Under the
Administrative Procedure Act—In Which Judicial Offspring Receive a Congressional Confirmation, 23 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 501, 537 (1948) (attributing the “illusion” of judicial abdication to “reckless and unsubstantiated charges”
by disappointed litigants).
110
See, e.g., Letter from Attorney General Clark to Hon. Pat McCarran, October 19, 1945, reprinted in SENATE
REPORT, supra note 100, at 37, 38 (APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 223, 224).
111

SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 39. Duffy discounts
the importance of the committee print by describing it as a mere staff document. Duffy, supra note 21, at 132 n.95.
However, nothing in the document itself supports that characterization. It referred to itself as having been issued by
the committee. APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 11. When the committee subsequently reported out the bill, it
clarified that the staff had summarized the comments of interested persons for the committee’s consideration, but the
committee had published the ensuing document. SENATE REPORT, supra note 100, at 5, reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra, at 191. Moreover, Senator McCarran, in his foreword to the published legislative history, described
the committee print as among the “legislative documents which accompany and explain [the Act’s] purpose and
operation [and] are of immediate and permanent importance.” APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at iii. Duffy also
emphasizes the word “unduly” in the quotation, suggesting that the committee did, after all, propose to move beyond
the extant case law. That puts a lot of weight on a single word; but if the committee did intend for that word to signify
anything significant, the most likely explanation is that the committee foresaw its eventual efforts to clarify the
meaning of the substantial evidence test. See infra notes 119, 131 and accompanying text. In contrast to that target of
overt congressional concern, nothing in the legislative record explicitly declares an intention to depart from thenprevailing case law regarding judicial review of legal issues. See infra Parts II.D.2, II.E.4.
112
As Professor Duffy points out, the terms “restate” and “restatement” carried “unmistakable connotations,”
bringing to mind the Restatements of the Law published by the American Law Institute (ALI). Duffy, supra note 21,
at 131. He notes that the ALI had always made clear that its restatements were designed to be applied flexibly; “even
if part of a restatement were enacted as law, the Institute suggested treating the statute as a common law precedent.”
Id. (To be sure, Duffy himself maintains that the APA should not be interpreted in that manner. See supra notes 50-
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§ 706, under this reading, was “merely” to summarize judicial doctrine without being too
confining. The remainder of the committee’s quotation fortifies this reading. The message seems
to have been that they needed to say something about scope of review, lest the Act be taken as
changing the law when that was not its purpose. The doctors’ precept “first, do no harm” seems
to have been their guiding spirit.
Indeed, a little reflection confirms that this interpretation is the most logical explanation
for what actually happened. The APA sponsors do not seem to have had much, if any, concern
about the courts’ disposition of legal issues. Or, if they did have a range of views on the subject,
they “agreed to disagree.” Certainly they supported the principle of judicial review of legal issues
as a general matter, but they were evidently content to refrain from giving courts specific directions
about how to fulfill that task. That is the most straightforward way to explain the fact that the APA
ultimately passed Congress with the Justice Department’s support and by unanimous votes in both
the House and Senate (including the votes of loyal New Dealers). This reading is also consistent
with this article’s suggestion that the authors of the Act were willing to provide courts with the
kind of latitude that would allow for doctrinal development over time.
Just after mentioning the “several categories of questions of law subject to judicial review,”
the committee added that “[e]ach category has been recognized,” having been “constantly repeated
by courts in the course of judicial decisions or opinions.” 113 Here the committee cited to the Final
Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure. 114 That committee had
been appointed by President Roosevelt for the purpose of building a record that Congress could
use in drafting administrative procedure legislation. Its report outlined some of the complexities
of the case law, including the limited review that courts sometimes gave to legal questions:
Even on questions of law [independent judicial] judgment seems not to be
compelled. The question of statutory interpretation might be approached by the court de
novo and given the answer which the court thinks to be the “right interpretation.” Or the
court might approach it, somewhat as a question of fact, to ascertain, not the “right
interpretation,” but only whether the administrative interpretation has substantial support.
Certain standards of interpretation guide in that direction. Thus, where the statute is
reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court may accept that of the
administrative body. Again, the administrative interpretation is to be given weight -- not
merely as the opinion of some men or even of a lower tribunal, but as the opinion of the
body especially familiar with the problems dealt with by the statute and burdened with the

54 and accompanying text. I think he is right, however, about the implications of the language that the Attorney
General and the Senate committee used.)
113

SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 39.

114
FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 778 [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (1941).
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duty of enforcing it. This may be particularly significant when the legislation deals with
complex matters calling for expert knowledge and judgment. 115
It is understandable that the committee, being thus advised, seems to have concluded that it should
not undertake to codify the subtle and elusive doctrines in this area.
Further evidence of the consensus that had developed around the committee’s approach
was the attitude of the American Bar Association. During most of the years of deliberation and
debate that led up to the final statute, the ABA had been a principal voice for stringent controls on
agencies. 116 But that assertive posture apparently did not extend to the issue of judicial review of
legal questions. Even the Walter-Logan bill, which the ABA had drafted and pushed through
Congress prior to its veto by President Roosevelt, addressed that issue only with a truism: “Any
decision of any agency or independent agency shall be set aside if . . . the decision is beyond the
jurisdiction of the agency or independent agency.” 117 The ABA’s unconcerned attitude toward
this issue was still discernible as of the time of the hearings on the bills that led directly to
enactment as the APA. Carl McFarland, the chairman of the ABA’s committee on administrative
procedure, was evidently on the same page as the Justice Department, as far as scope of review
was concerned. He remarked during the House’s hearings that “we do not believe the principle of
review or the extent of review can or should be greatly altered,” and “the scope of review should
be as it now is.” 118
It’s true that the “restatement” language was omitted from the final reports in 1946. This
omission probably does not bespeak a sea change in the drafters’ intentions regarding deference,
as it is hardly likely that legislators would have altered their attitude from “restating” case law to
radically transforming it, while making no change in the actual language. To be sure, it is possible
that the omission was a direct result of a growing feeling that they were not entirely satisfied with
current case law. If so, however, the most reasonable inference is that they wanted to distance
themselves from the status quo in relation to substantial evidence review. To this extent, the
115
Id. at 90. See generally Sunstein, Chevron as Law, supra note 23, at 1646-48 (discussing the background of
the report); Shepherd, supra note 107, at 1632-36 (same).
116

See Shepherd, supra note 107, at 1569-79, 1588-93.

117

H.R. 6324, 76th Cong. § 5(a)(4) (1940). The bill was reprinted as an appendix to Roosevelt’s veto message.
Message from the President of the United States, H.R. DOC. 79-986, at 15 (1940) [hereinafter Veto Message].
118

Duffy dismisses McFarland’s remark by suggesting that Congress had little if any respect for Supreme Court
case law. He quotes Representative Walter’s response to McFarland as follows: “You say [the scope of review should
be] ‘as it now is.’ Frankly, I do not know what it is. . . . [T]he Supreme Court apparently changes its mind daily.”
Duffy, supra note 21, at 132-33 (quoting Administrative Procedure: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
79th Cong. 38 (1945) [hereinafter House Hearings], reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 45,
84)). Read in context, however, this remark, and the colloquy of which it was a part, pertained exclusively to judicial
review of facts under the substantial evidence standard. Id. at 37-40 (APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 83-86). The
congressmen in the colloquy evinced no particular concern about review of legal issues. (Indeed, if Duffy had not
edited down Walter’s statement with an ellipsis, the latter’s focus would have been apparent. In the omitted passage,
Walter said: “I do not know whether the rule as laid down in the Consolidated Edison case is the law, or what the law
is.” Id. at 38. He was referring to Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938), a leading substantial
evidence case.)
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commentators’ charge that the Attorney General’s “restatement” talk was spin, or at least diverged
from the legislators’ own expectations, may have been well taken. 119 Yet nothing in the legislative
history indicates that the standard of review of agencies’ statutory and regulatory interpretations
was particularly controversial. In the next section, I will critically examine the passages that
commentators have cited to demonstrate otherwise.
2. Countervailing claims
Of course, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s “restatement” language must be read together
with other legislative history language. Proponents of the de novo interpretation of the first
sentence of § 706 also had “friends” at the figurative cocktail party. Some of the quotations on
which Justice Gorsuch relied in Kisor might be better described as “party crashers”: They may
have contained colorful language, but they did not belong at this social gathering, because they
were not really discussing judicial review of questions of law. Or, to switch metaphors, they were
raspberries rather than cherries. 120 On the other hand, Gorsuch and other supporters of the de novo
interpretation have also relied on certain other legislative history materials that do at least address
the relevant subject matter. In this section I will discuss those passages.
1. Justice Gorsuch relied on assertions in the House and Senate committee reports that
“[§ 706] provides that questions of law are for the courts rather than agencies to decide in the last
analysis and it also lists the several categories of questions of law.” 121 That statement would give
stronger support to his side if it had not included the very revealing phrase “in the last analysis.”
119
Actually, subsequent case law has fully supported the Attorney General’s expectation that the APA codified
“present law” on substantial evidence. The preferable reading of the Act, and the Court’s subsequent interpretation
of it in Universal Camera, is that the “whole record” proviso added during legislative deliberations amounted to an
admonition to apply prior doctrine more conscientiously, but it did not alter that doctrine. Post-APA case law has
uniformly continued to treat pre-APA doctrine on substantial evidence as authoritative. See Ronald M. Levin, The
Regulatory Accountability Act and the Future of APA Reform, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 487, 535-38 (2019). (Recall the
Court’s intimation that Congress’s perceptions about the supposed abuses of substantial evidence review were
mistaken. See supra note 109.)
120

Those passages, which Gorsuch quoted in Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2436-37, included the following: (a) Senator
Pat McCarran, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, did write that it would be “hard . . . for anyone to argue that
this Act did anything other than cut down the ‘cult of discretion’ so far as federal law is concerned.” McCarran, supra
note 63, at 831, 893 (1946). In context, however, the senator used this remark to sum up a passage that mainly dealt
with judicial review of discretion (as his words did say). McCarran said nothing in this passage about review of legal
questions, except for the self-evident observation that, “[o]f course, [agencies] must not proceed in disregard of the
Constitution, statutes, or other limitations recognized by law.” Id.
(b) Justice Frankfurter did write that “courts must now assume more responsibility for the reasonableness
and fairness of Labor Board decisions than some courts have shown in the past.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951). But the Court’s opinion in Universal Camera dealt exclusively with fact review and the
substantial evidence test. (And even at that, the better reading of the opinion is that it did not interpret the APA as
having changed existing law. See supra note 119.)
(c) Finally, when Representative Walter declared that he did not know what the scope of judicial review
was, due to vacillation by the Supreme Court, he too was referring to substantial evidence review of facts, not review
of legal issues. See supra note 118.
121
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 100, at 44, reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 278;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 100, at 28, reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 214.
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That phrase suggests a sharing of responsibility between the judicial and executive branches, while
hedging on the question of how much influence the agency’s view might legitimately carry. In
this respect, it seems directly comparable to the statement in Chevron itself that “the judiciary is
the final authority on issues of statutory construction,” 122 or to the statement in Mortgage Bankers
that “[e]ven in cases where an agency’s interpretation receives Auer deference, . . . it is the court
that ultimately decides whether a given regulation means what the agency says.” 123 Similar
language—including “in the last analysis”—appeared in pre-Chevron case law as well. 124 All of
these formulations, including those in the APA committee reports, raise the issue of deference, but
they appear to be essentially neutral on the question of how that issue should be resolved in various
contexts. 125
2. Proponents of the “de novo” interpretation of the initial sentence of § 706 also point to
an explanation on the House floor by Representative Walter, a Judiciary Committee member who
chaired the subcommittee that was handling the bill: “Subsection (e) of section 10 [now § 706]
requires courts to determine independently all relevant questions of law, including the
interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions and the determination of the meaning or
applicability of any agency action.” 126 At first glance, the word “independently” seems to give
direct support to Justice Gorsuch’s thesis. It is no wonder that some proponents give special
prominence to Walter’s comment. 127
This use of Walter’s statement has some difficulties, however. In the first place, its
authoritative value is open to question. Even during the era when objections to legislative history
arguments were not as prominent as they are today, statements by individual legislators were

122

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).

123

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 n.4 (2015). See also Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2420
(plurality opinion) (quoting much of the same language from Mortgage Bankers, and adding that “the meaning of a
legislative rule remains in the hands of courts, even if they sometimes divine that meaning by looking to the agency’s
interpretation.”).
124

See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1985) (“[W]hile informed judicial determination
is dependent upon enlightenment gained from administrative experience, in the last analysis the words ‘deceptive
practices’ set forth a legal standard and they must get their final meaning from judicial construction.”) (emphasis
added). See also FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981) (courts are “final authorities
on issues of statutory construction”); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978) (same).
125

In the concluding section of its report, headed “General Comments,” the Senate committee did say that the
courts would be responsible for “the enforcement of the bill, by the independent judicial interpretation and application
of its terms.” SENATE REPORT, supra note 100, at 31, reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 217
(emphasis added). That remark was unsurprising, because courts have never deferred to agencies’ interpretations of
the APA, which is not administered by any single agency. See, e.g., Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121,
137 n.9 (1997); United States v. Fla. E.C. Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 236 n.6 (1973); Air N. Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 937
F.2d 1427, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1991).
126

92 CONG. REC. 5654 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 370 (emphasis

added).
127
NELSON, supra note 20, at 707 n.26; Duffy, supra note 21, at 193-94; Beermann, End the Experiment, supra
note 20, at 789. Justice Gorsuch himself cited the statement without quoting it. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2436 n.64.
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regarded as among the least reliable sources of insight into congressional intentions.128 Such
skepticism is certainly warranted in this instance. As discussed above, some fellow members of
Walter’s committee seemingly did not share his expansive understanding of the first sentence of §
706. Two of them gave floor speeches, apparently less than an hour after Walter had spoken, in
which they summarized the standards of review that § 706 would prescribe; they did not mention
the first sentence of § 706 at all. 129 To say the least, these mixed signals would justify some doubts
about the extent to which Walter’s views were held by the entire enacting Congress.
There is also a more fundamental problem with the proponents’ use of Representative
Walter’s statement that courts must resolve questions of law “independently.” The statement
appears not to have the meaning that they ascribe to it. Immediately after making this statement,
Walter went on to recite the other provisions of § 706. Then he said: “The term ‘substantial
evidence’ as used in this bill means evidence which on the whole record as reviewed by the court
and in the exercise of the independent judgment of the reviewing court is material to the issues,
clearly substantial, and plainly sufficient to support a finding or conclusion. . . .” 130 Walter knew
perfectly well, of course, that courts do not find facts de novo when they conduct substantial
evidence review. At most, it is review for reasonableness. 131 When he said that such review must
be “independent,” he must have meant something more modest—presumably, that the courts must
conduct this reasonableness review while remaining mindful that they are part of a separate branch
of government, not beholden to the executive branch. This reasoning strongly implies that
Walter’s use of “independently” in the preceding paragraph meant the same thing. He was making
a valid point about checks and balances, but he was not necessarily trying to specify the extent to
which courts may or may not rely on administrative views on questions of law when they seek to
fulfill that function.
3. Another congressional remark that has found its way into this legislative history debate
stemmed from the Senate Judiciary Committee’s account of the thinking behind one of the
exemptions in the APA’s provision on agency rulemaking. Subsection 553(b)(A) of the APA
128

See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969) (“A
committee report represents the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting
and studying proposed legislation. Floor debates reflect at best the understanding of individual Congressmen.”); Stuart
Minor Benjamin & Kristen M. Renberg, The Paradoxical Impact of Scalia’s Campaign Against Legislative History,
105 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1028-30 (2020) (citing numerous cases and commentators).
129

See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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92 CONG. REC. 5654 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 370. The House and
Senate committee reports likewise instruct courts to apply the substantial evidence test “in the exercise of their
independent judgment.” HOUSE REPORT, supra note 100, at 45, reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at
279; SENATE REPORT, supra note 100, at 30, reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 216.
131

Like other members of Congress, Walter insisted that substantial evidence should be understood to mean that
an agency’s fact findings must be reasonable, as prescribed in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
They worried that the Court sometimes seemed to favor a more deferential standard (the so-called scintilla test). See
supra note 118; see also 92 CONG. REC. 5656 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 37576 (colloquy among Reps. Voorhis, Gwynne, and Springer) (agreeing that the bill would require a finding to rest on
substantial evidence, not just a scintilla). Ultimately, the APA settled that question in favor of the interpretation that
they preferred.
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permits an agency to issue “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, [and] rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice” without resorting to notice-and-comment procedure. 132 In its
1945 committee print, the committee mentioned several justifications for this exemption and then
added: “Another reason, which might be added, is that ‘interpretative’ rules—as merely
interpretations of statutory provisions—are subject to plenary judicial review, whereas
‘substantive’ rules involve a maximum of administrative discretion.” 133 Some proponents of the
de novo interpretation of the first sentence of § 706 have cited the committee’s reference to
“plenary judicial review” as evidence supporting their position. 134
In an earlier article about the rulemaking exemption, I noted that this sentence in the report
“reads like an afterthought, tacked on at the end of a series of policy arguments that were intended
to apply to all nonlegislative rules (and procedural rules).” 135 I also said that this claim, which
does not appear anywhere else in the APA’s legislative history, was poorly reasoned as a rationale
for the exemption. 136 Moreover, as Justice Scalia pointed out in a well-known lecture on the
Chevron doctrine, the sentence’s premise that questions of law would always be decided de novo
by courts was itself a “quite mistaken assumption.” 137 Referring back to the description of thencurrent law in the report of the Attorney General’s Committee, 138 Scalia concluded that the
committee print’s characterization “is not true today, and it was not categorically true in 1945.”139
The most critical point about the committee’s reference to plenary review is that it did not
purport to be an explication of the meaning of § 706. Rather, as just stated, it was a descriptive
generalization used as a partial justification for an entirely separate provision of the APA. 140
Whoever wrote it may not have been paying attention to the then-proposed language of § 706.
Moreover, this passage could easily have been overlooked by other participants in the legislative
debates—both inside and outside Congress—who may have had a better informed or more
nuanced view on the judicial review issue. (That is, they may not have been aware of the assertion
about plenary review before the committee print was published. Afterwards, they may have been
in a better position to know about it—a fact that could explain why the assertion was never repeated
anywhere in the legislative history.)

132

5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).

133

SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 59, reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 18.

134

See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 20, at 707 n.26; Duffy, supra note 21, at 194 n.406.

135

Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance Exemption, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 263, 323 (2018).

136

Id. at 327-28 (noting that, under established law, the absence of required procedural safeguards justifies a
relatively intrusive standard of judicial review, and it is circular to claim that the opposite should also be true).
137

Scalia, supra note 37, at 514.

138

See supra note 115 and accompanying text (quoting Attorney General’s Committee).

139

Scalia, supra note 37, at 514.

140

The fact that the committee language did not purport to explain the meaning of § 706 helps to explain why
Justice Scalia felt free to probe its argument, notwithstanding his well-known aversion to relying on legislative history
to ascertain statutory meaning.
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Even lawyers who are generally sympathetic to the use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation tend to emphasize that interpreters should pay careful attention to whether any
particular quotation was rendered under circumstances that would tend to attest to or cast doubt on
its reliability. 141 In this instance, the circumstances surrounding the committee’s assertion about
plenary review of agency interpretations in its discussion of § 553(b)(A) suggest that the claim is
not reliable evidence as to what § 706 means.
4. When the Attorney General’s Committee released its report in 1941, a minority of its
members proposed a bill that later became the direct precursor of the APA legislation. One section
of the bill resembled the current § 706 but also included this proviso: “That upon such review due
weight shall be accorded the experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and
legislative policy of the agency involved as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon
it.” 142 By the time Congress actually got around to considering administrative procedure bills,
however, the proviso had been dropped from the scope-of-review section. Some commentators
have interpreted this omission as a sign that the drafters intended to repudiate such deference. 143
Once again, standard statutory construction doctrine militates against this argument. Even
in the years of widespread reliance on legislative history materials, courts were typically wary of
putting much stock in the legislature’s failure to adopt particular proposals. 144 There was no
ironclad prohibition on such reliance, but courts generally agreed that an unusually powerful
showing would be necessary in order to accord significance to the rejection of proposed language.
They often pointed out, in rejecting such arguments, that there were simply too many other possible
explanations for failure to enact a proposal.
The controversy over the de novo interpretation of the first sentence of § 706 aptly
illustrates the force of this objection. After all, when the committee minority had described the
scope-of-review section in an explanatory note, it had suggested that it expected the proviso to
make no substantive difference. It said that the section “is simply the recognized measure of
judicial review now obtaining in the courts and . . . should be recognized by clear and unmistakable
legislative definition.” 145 Perhaps, therefore, the APA drafters’ only disagreement with the
committee minority was that, in contrast to the latter’s view, they thought that the proviso’s
141

See, e.g., George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative
Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 41.
142

FINAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 246-47.

143

Bamzai, Origins, supra note 21, at 986; John Dickinson, Administrative Procedure Act: Scope and Grounds
of Broadened Judicial Review, 33 A.B.A.J. 434, 517-18 n.40 (1947).
144

Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 566 U.S. 399, 422 (2012) (“Novo’s argument highlights the
perils of relying on the fate of prior bills to divine the meaning of enacted legislation. ‘A bill can be proposed for any
number of reasons, and it can be rejected for just as many others.’”) (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 170 (2001)); Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 723 (1989) (quoting
Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 61 (1947)); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 128, 132 n.8 (1989);
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47 (1950) (applying the same principle to an unenacted APA amendment).
145

FINAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 246. Indeed, as the APA drafters would have known, the minority report
was written by some of the most conservative members of the committee. Shepherd, supra note 107, at 1632. They
were unlikely to have been trying to shift the law in the agencies’ favor.
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message was so clearly right, or so well recognized, that it did not need to be spelled out.
Alternatively, some APA drafters may have agreed with the substance of the minority’s language
but have thought that, as a drafting matter, the proviso did not fit very well into its proposed
context. The section is otherwise written in bare-bones fashion, and the proviso would have been
conspicuously out of harmony with that approach. Still other drafters may have wanted to avoid
tying the courts’ hands, or may simply have had no opinion about this deference question. Thus,
even assuming some disparity of views among the drafters, there does not seem to be any
foundation for the inference that some significant number of legislators wanted to omit the
committee minority’s proviso because they disagreed with it. 146
E. Prior Case Law
The state of case law in the years leading up to the enactment of the APA has been a
prominent locus of attention in the debate over the meaning of the first sentence of § 706. In the
abstract, the use of this reference point for interpretation accords with standard statutory
construction doctrine. As the Supreme Court has said, it will “look to ‘the state of the law at the
time the legislation was enacted’ for guidance in defining” a statutory term. 147 More recently,
Justice Scalia maintained that “[t]he meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined
. . . on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and . . .
(2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated
— a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind.” 148
As with other statutory construction principles, this mode of reasoning should not be
applied inflexibly. Interpreters should not overlook the possibility that legislators were not paying
attention to prior case law, or deliberately intended to override it. Moreover, it is sometimes
difficult to characterize what the prior case law actually was. Nevertheless, as I have shown above,
the legislative record of the APA’s enactment contains few if any indications that Congress
intended to bring about a departure from the courts’ existing practices of taking account of
agencies’ interpretations of administrative statutes and regulations. Accordingly, we should
carefully examine what courts had been saying about those practices as of 1946.
1. The case law of the early 1940s
As it happens, the early 1940s were a particularly fertile period in the development of
doctrines of judicial deference to administrators on legal issues. 149 The Court established a number
of precedents that have continued to loom large in modern case law and secondary literature. One
reason for this transformation was that President Roosevelt had appointed a crop of justices who
would be sympathetic to protecting New Deal programs from judicial assault. Another reason,
146

See Green, supra note 24, at 690 n.209 (rejecting Bamzai’s contention on the ground that “[l]egislative silence
is often a difficult way to prove a thesis of drastic change”).
147

Randall v. Luftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 662 (1986) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran,
456 U. S. 353, 378 (1982)).
148

Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

149

See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 575 (1965).
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intertwined with the first, was the Court’s growing recognition that it needed to reckon with the
burgeoning body of federal legislation in which Congress had entrusted broad discretionary
authority to agencies. To some degree these precedents built upon earlier case law, 150 but the
1940s decisions articulated their message in bolder, and more enduring, terms.
One of the first judicial milestones in this line of authority was Gray v. Powell. 151 The
Court spoke of deference in broad terms:
Where, as here, a determination has been left to an administrative body, this delegation will
be respected and the administrative conclusion left untouched. . . . Although we have here
no dispute as to the evidentiary facts, that does not permit a court to substitute its judgment
for that of the Director. . . . It is not the province of a court to absorb the administrative
functions to such an extent that the executive or legislative agencies become mere factfinding bodies deprived of the advantages of prompt and definite action. 152
Gray was soon followed by NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 153 another venerable casebook
staple that has been prominent in the scholarly literature down to modern times. The Court’s
opinion in Hearst suggested—at least when broadly read—that an agency’s decision that applied
its organic statute to a particular set of facts should be upheld if it had “warrant in the record and
a reasonable basis in law.” 154
Other opinions explored variations on this basic theme. In Dobson v. Commissioner,155
the Court announced that it would apply the Hearst “warrant in the record” test to certain tax cases.
A distinctive feature of the opinion was that the Court seemed to distance itself from the analytic
meanings of “law” and “fact.” Instead, the Court justified this deferential standard of review on
purely practical grounds, including especially the Tax Court’s superior qualifications in handling
complex questions at the intersection of law and accounting. As I will discuss later, this particular

150

See id. (“properly speaking the doctrine of Gray v. Powell is as traditional as it is sound”).

151

314 U.S. 402 (1941); see Bernard Schwartz, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact and the Administrative
Procedure Act, 19 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 76-77 (1950) (stating that Gray was “[a]mong the important cases of this
type” and “seem[ed] to mark a definite break with earlier doctrine”); see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW § 10.31 (2d ed. 1984) (stating years later that Gray is “generally considered the leading case” for the “rule of
review under the reasonableness test of findings involving applications of legal concepts to facts”).
152

Gray, 314 U.S. at 412.

153

322 U.S. 111 (1944).

154

I add the qualifier “when broadly read” because the opinion also contained language that could be reconciled
with a more robust concept of judicial review of legal questions: “Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation,
especially when arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate
weight to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute.” Id. at 130-31 (emphasis
added). In practice, however, this nuance has often been overlooked, so that Hearst has been widely regarded as
simply standing for the proposition that an agency’s legal determinations should be reviewed only for reasonableness.
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 151, at 78; L.B. Lea, Comment, 47 MICH. L. REV. 675, 677-80 (1947); cf. JAFFE, supra
note 149, at 575 (lamenting that the nuance is often overlooked).
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320 U.S. 489 (1943).
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line of reasoning elicited strenuous criticism in the literature, and is no longer authoritative. 156 For
several years prior to its demise, however, Dobson did have some credibility as a leading
precedent. 157
Also decided during this period was Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 158 which arose in the context
of a private damage suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Congress had not authorized any
administrative agency to adjudicate such claims, but the Court said that courts should nevertheless
heed advisory rulings by the Wage-Hour Administrator. Such rulings, “while not controlling on
the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” 159 One other landmark precedent
handed down during this period was Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 160 which originated
what later came to be known as Auer deference. As such, it remained for many years the leading
case authority encouraging courts to defer to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations.
I have discussed here the most widely known of the Court’s cases on the scope of review
of agency interpretations of law during the early 1940s, but several other decisions, less familiar
to modern readers, projected a similarly deferential attitude. 161 In addition, the Court’s new
jurisprudence elicited extensive discussion in the law review literature. 162
All of this activity in the Court and the secondary literature served to confirm and reinforce
the overview of the case law set forth in the report to Congress by the Attorney General’s
Committee on Administrative Procedure. As noted earlier in this article, the committee called
Congress’s attention to situations in which “the administrative interpretation is . . . given weight .
. . as the opinion of the body especially familiar with the problems dealt with by the statute and
burdened with the duty of enforcing it, [especially] when the legislation deals with complex
matters calling for expert knowledge and judgment.” 163 A straightforward application of the
precedents mentioned at the beginning of this section would seem to suggest that the APA should
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See, e.g., JAFFE, supra note 149, at 579-82; Randolph E. Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways
of Law and Fact, 57 HARV. L. REV. 73 (1944).
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See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Scope of Review of Federal Administrative Action, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 559,
567-69 (1950) (hereinafter Davis, Scope]; Schwartz, supra note 151, at 73.
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323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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Id. at 140.
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325 U.S. 410 (1945).

161
See, e.g., United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515, 535-36 (1946) (using language
similar to that of Hearst); ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 (1945) (following Gray); Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S.
542, 552-53 (1944) (following Gray); Fed. Security Adm’r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1943) (applying
similar principles in a rulemaking context).
162
See, e.g., C. Herman Pritchett, The Supreme Court and Administrative Regulation, 1941-44, 31 IOWA L. REV.
103, 105-08 (1945); Robert L. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative
Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 90-109 (1944); Paul, supra note 156; Ray A. Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review,
56 HARV, L. REV. 899 (1943).
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FINAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 91; see supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
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be construed to allow courts to continue to use the same approach. As the next section will show,
however, proponents of the de novo interpretation of § 706 have reached a different conclusion.
2. The rollback analysis
An ambitious article by Professor Bamzai 164 has dominated academic discussion of the
historical record regarding the pre-APA case law on this issue. Justices Gorsuch 165 and Thomas 166
have relied heavily on his account, and the article has been widely praised and cited as
authoritative. 167 Thus, it calls for a serious and careful analysis.
Bamzai recognizes that courts and commentators have generally supposed that the case law
on judicial deference to agency interpretations of law was in considerable disarray prior to
Chevron, but he discerns much more orderliness in those precedents. 168 To develop this thesis, he
focuses on two statutory interpretation canons that he says originated in English law at least four
centuries ago. One of these canons was contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissimo in lege—
or “a contemporaneous exposition is the best and most powerful in law.” 169 The other was optimus
imterpres legum consuetudo—”usage is the best interpreter of laws.” 170 Bamzai spends fifteen
pages tracing the evolution of these canons in English and American law. 171 The thrust of his
argument is that contemporaneously adopted, longstanding interpretations of constitutional and
statutory texts carried considerable weight in the court decisions of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
What makes Bamzai’s account especially interesting, and relevant to the present article, is
his claim that, until the modern era, courts had no deference doctrine that we would recognize
today. They frequently followed administrative interpretations if (and only if) they were rendered
contemporaneously with the interpreted statute, or had been consistently followed for a long time,
or both. But the “respect” that the Court showed was simply because of their contemporaneity or
consistency, not because they were administrative interpretations. He repeats this claim several
times in the article. 172
164

Bamzai, Origins, supra note 21.

165

Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2426 nn. 5-6, 2433 n.49 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

166

United States v. Baldwin, 140 S. Ct. 690, 693-94 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

167

See, e.g., Bernick, supra note 55, at 826-27, 850; Richard A. Epstein, Leviathan’s Apologists, LAW &
LIBERTY, Sept. 16, 2020, https://lawliberty.org/book-review/leviathan-administrative-state-sunstein-vermeule/;
Pojanowski, supra note 55, at 885-86; Richard W. Murphy, Abandon Chevron and Modernize Stare Decisis for the
Administrative State, 69 ALA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2017); Christopher Walker, Chevron’s Origin Story, JOTWELL, October
5, 2016, https://adlaw.jotwell.com/chevrons-origin-story/ (reviewing Bamzai).
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Bamzai, Origins, supra note 21, at 915-16.
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Id. at 933-34.

170

Id. at 937.

171

Id. at 931-44.

172

Id. at 916 (“the prevailing interpretive methodology of nineteenth-century American courts was not a form of
judicial deference, [but rather was] part of a practice of deferring to longstanding and contemporaneous interpretations
generally. . . . [T]he fact that the interpretation had been articulated by an actor within the executive branch was
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Bamzai acknowledges some limitations on the breadth of this thesis. In mandamus
proceedings, he reports, the Court displayed great restraint in challenging agency interpretations.
But this restraint, he continues, was not a product of judicial willingness to put stock in the
agencies’ views as such. Rather, it occurred because of the historical traditions of mandamus, a
prerogative writ that would issue only in cases of blatant abuses. The importance of the mandamus
line of cases faded after 1875, when Congress created general federal question jurisdiction in the
district courts. Persons who wished to challenge agency action increasingly invoked the court’s
equity jurisdiction, in which judges were allowed to exercise independent judgment in resolving
questions of law. 173 A second complication was that the courts’ domain of independent judgment
applied only to “questions of law,” as distinguished from “questions of fact.” In practice, the line
between these two types of questions was indistinct. 174 Despite these refinements, however,
Bamzai contends that, as of the turn of the century, there was “no general rule of statutory
construction requiring ‘deference’ to executive interpretation qua executive interpretation.” 175
In the early decades of the twentieth century, Bamzai continues, the tradition of
contemporaneity and continuity as the key to acceptance of administrative interpretations became
less stable. Courts made occasional departures from that baseline, 176 although these deviations
were only temporary. 177 Moreover, scholars who had absorbed the teachings of the legal realism
movement seemed to become increasingly aware of the flexibility inherent in the law-fact
distinction. This line of thinking meant that “mixed questions of law and fact” with a substantial
legal component could be reviewed deferentially if a court were inclined to do so. 178 Eventually,
this reasoning would open the door to the type of deferential review of legal questions epitomized
by Chevron. Yet, Bamzai argues, the tradition of focusing on contemporaneous and continued

relevant, but incidental.”); id. at 941 (“courts’ repeated assertions that certain executive interpretations of legal text
should receive ‘respect’ were in fact applications of the theory that an ambiguous legal text should be given its
contemporaneous and customary meaning”); id. at 943 (“Judges ‘deferred’ to or ‘respected’ executive statutory
constructions because they were contemporaneous to enactment or customary, not because they were executive as
such”).
173

Id. at 947-58.

174

Id. at 959-62.

175

Id. at 965.

176
Id. at 966-68 (discussing Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106 (1904), a deferential case, but asserting
that it “swung in a relatively narrow arc”).
177

Id. at 971 (discussing Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1 (1932), as “an example of the continued
vitality of the [contemporary and customary] canons of construction”).
178

Id. at 971-75. Bamzai properly emphasizes the role of John Dickinson in stimulating this trend. Id.
(discussing JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
(1927)). See generally Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Book Review, Neoclassical Administrative Common Law, THE NEW
RAMBLER, Sept. 26, 2016, https://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/neoclassical-administrative-commonlaw (evaluating Dickinson’s legacy). Ironically, Dickinson later became a stern critic of functionalist tendencies in
the case law on deference. See infra Part II.F.2.
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interpretation, or their absence, remained substantially intact up through the early New Deal
period. 179
Bamzai recognizes that Supreme Court cases of the 1940s, such as Gray, Hearst, and
Skidmore “effectively abandon[ed] the traditional interpretive methodology.” 180 Although the
Court was by no means consistent in the manner in which it implemented the “jurisprudential
phenomenon of the 1940s,” he continues, the common theme in these cases was that they were
“departures from the traditional interpretive methodology and intellectual framework that
privileged contemporary and customary interpretations.” 181 But, he maintains, the APA reflected
a public or at least congressional backlash against those cases. Congress then responded to that
backlash by reinstituting and codifying the pre-1940 regime of “independent” review regarding
questions of law. 182 This purported resuscitation of seemingly superseded doctrine is a crucial
step in Bamzai’s article, and consequently I refer to his article as a “rollback” analysis. Now,
Bamzai concludes, the legal system must come to terms with the fact that our jurisprudence has
gotten far out of line with what Congress intended in the APA.
3. Critique of the rollback analysis: pre-1940
There is much to admire in Bamzai’s article. His discussion of precedents on judicial
review of administrative interpretations over the course of many decades, together with the
scholarly literature, is richly detailed and often incisive. For example, his discussion of the limited
significance of mandamus may or may not be correct, but it is at least a strong contribution to the
literature on that subject. It is especially noteworthy because it takes issue with a contrary claim
by Justice Scalia. 183 In addition, Bamzai’s explanation of the manner in which the intellectual
trends of the 1920s and 1930s gave rise to the Supreme Court jurisprudence of the 1940s is
rewarding and persuasive. However, I completely disagree with his explanation of how early case
law on deference relates to § 706 of the APA. Before I get to that point, I will critically examine
some aspects of his discussion of that case law on its own terms.
It is certainly true that numerous cases throughout our history have declared that
administrative interpretations that were adopted soon after the interpreted text, or that have been
in place for a long time, or both, are particularly reliable, and interpretations that lack these

179
Bamzai, Origins, supra note 21, at 969 (“courts in the first few decades of the twentieth century generally
hewed to the traditional interpretive formulations”); id. at 976 (noting that James Landis anticipated the future advent
of deferential review of legal questions but also acknowledged that “judicial deference to executive interpretation was
not the law, circa 1938”).
180
Id. at 976-77; see also id. at 981 (Hearst and Skidmore were “departures from the traditional interpretive
methodology and intellectual framework that privileged contemporary and customary interpretations”).
181

Id. at 979-81.

182

Id. at 918, 987-88, 990.

183
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Chevron deference
is largely a product of the mandamus tradition).
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attributes carry much less weight, if any. 184 Bamzai’s article amply documents that observation,
but his description of the case law is overstated in a few respects. In the first place, the cases that
support this proposition have focused specifically on their relationship to administrative
interpretations in particular. Despite the impression that Bamzai’s article evidently seeks to leave,
not a single one of these cases undertook to support these factors on the basis of their recognition
in other fields such as civil litigation (and they certainly didn’t invoke the Latin canons that Bamzai
discusses, nor their English-language equivalents). 185
More importantly, Bamzai’s contention that contemporary adoption and customary usage
were the central considerations in this body of case law, with deference concepts being irrelevant
or at most “incidental,” is far too reductionist. The opinions simply aren’t written that way. 186
For example, immediately after declaring that “[j]udges ‘deferred’ to or ‘respected’
executive statutory constructions because they were contemporaneous to enactment or customary,
not because they were executive as such,” Bamzai remarks that “[t]he leading case for many years
was Edward’s Lessee v. Darby.” 187 In that 1827 decision, the Court wrote: “In the construction
of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who were called
upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very
great respect.” 188 Notice, first, that the Court did not directly refer to the heritage of canons on
which Bamzai places such emphasis. Second, although the quoted language did mention that the
interpretation in dispute had been a “contemporaneous construction,” the quotation also called
attention to pertinent facts about the land commissioners who had adopted the interpretation—
”those who were called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into
effect.” Unless we suppose that the Court included all those latter words for no reason, we have
to assume that it thought that the “great respect” to which the interpretation was entitled was in
part a function of the perspective that the commissioners possessed as implementers of the statute.
At best, the Edwards opinion was ambiguous as to the relative weight of these factors in the Court’s
thinking.
Before the nineteenth century came to an end, the Court was writing opinions that
suggested much more strongly that the principle of administrative deference was an important
variable in its own right. For example, in the 1878 case of United States v. Moore, 189 the Court
said that “[t]he construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it is
always entitled to the most respectful consideration, and ought not to be overruled without cogent
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See Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, Supreme Court’s View as to Weight and Effect to be Given, on Subsequent
Judicial Construction, to Prior Administrative Construction of Statute, 39 L. Ed. 2d 942, §§ 8-9 (1975).
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See Green, supra note 24, at 682-83.
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See generally Schopler, supra note 184, § 3 (characterizing deference as a general rule, subject to exceptions).
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25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 (1827); see Bamzai, Origins, supra note 21, at 943.

188

Edwards, 25 U.S. at 210.
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95 U.S. 760 (1878).
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reasons.” 190 Indeed, the Court continued, “[t]he officers concerned are usually able men, and
masters of the subject. Not unfrequently they are the draftsmen of the laws they are afterwards
called upon to interpret.” 191 Although the Moore opinion did, as Bamzai notes, also mention that
the Navy had always followed the interpretation under discussion, that detail appeared four
paragraphs earlier, and the Court did not especially emphasize it. 192 Similarly, in Hastings &
Dakota R.R. v. Whitney, 193 an 1889 case, the opinion quoted the “able men, and masters of the
subject” language from Moore, and also stated that “decisions of the Land Department on matters
of law [like the present one] are entitled to great respect at the hands of any court.” 194 As in Moore,
the Court mentioned that the agency had long adhered to the interpretation in question, but it did
not suggest that this detail was a sine qua non for, or even particularly relevant to, the deference
principle that it articulated. 195 And in Webster v. Luther, 196 decided in 1896, when the Court did
refer to the “important interests [that] have grown up under the [administrative] practice adopted
[under the agency’s interpretation],” it spoke of that factor as enhancing the argument for
deference but not as a prerequisite for it. 197
By the early twentieth century, the Court would sometimes rely on the deference principle
without mentioning the contemporaneity or continuity of the agency’s interpretation at all. 198 And
190

Id. at 763.
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Id.
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Id. at 762.
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132 U.S. 357 (1889).
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Id. at 366.
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Id.
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163 U.S. 331 (1896).

197
See id. at 342 (“The practical construction given to an act of Congress, fairly susceptible of different
constructions, by one of the Executive Departments of the government, is always entitled to the highest respect, and
in doubtful cases should be followed by the courts, especially when important interests have grown up under the
practice adopted”) (emphasis added). For a similar case of somewhat later vintage, see Estate of Sanford v. Comm’r,
308 U.S. 39, 52 (1939) (stating in dictum that the courts’ willingness to give “persuasive weight” to the views of
“those who are expert in the field and specially informed as to administrative needs and convenience, tends to the wise
interpretation and just administration of the laws. This is the more so when reliance has been placed on the practice
by those affected by it.”) (emphasis added).
198

See, e.g., FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934) (“the Commission . . . was created with the
avowed purpose of lodging the administrative functions committed to it in ‘a body specially competent to deal with
them by reason of information, experience and careful study of the business and economic conditions of the industry
affected,’ and [with terms of office that] would ‘give to them an opportunity to acquire the expertness in dealing with
these special questions concerning industry that comes from experience.’”); Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 336
(1930) (“It is the settled rule that the practical interpretation of an ambiguous or doubtful statute that has been acted
upon by officials charged with its administration will not be disturbed except for weighty reasons.”); La Roque v.
United States, 239 U.S. 62, 64 (1915) (“While not conclusive, this construction given to the act in the course of its
actual execution [by the Secretary of the Interior] is entitled to great respect and ought not to be overruled without
cogent and persuasive reasons.”); Boston v. Maine R.R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97, 117-18 (1914) (“This requirement is
a practical interpretation of the law by the administrative body having its enforcement in charge, and is entitled to
weight in construing the act.”).
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in other cases, the Court relied on deference even when the conditions envisioned by the canons
were demonstrably not met. One such case, which Bamzai does discuss, 199 was Bates & Guild
Co. v. Payne, 200 which upheld a ruling of the Postmaster General that directly contradicted the
interpretation that the agency had followed for sixteen years prior to its decision in that proceeding.
Bamzai regards Bates as an outlier; but if so, it was not the only one. 201
In short, contemporaneity and continuity were important factors in the common law of
judicial review, but deference was in various ways an independent and salient variable. In other
words, the diffuseness that most commentators have discerned really did exist. That complexity
in the case law casts doubt on Bamzai’s claim that, in the APA, Congress adopted the narrow
conception of deference that his article expounds. In any event, a larger problem with his argument
is his account of the relationship between the APA and the case law of the early 1940s, and I now
turn to that aspect of the historical record.
4. Critique of the rollback analysis: post-1940
Bamzai’s summary of the early 1940s cases is not materially different from the account I
set forth in Part II.E.1. He declares that “the Supreme Court in the early 1940s steadily expanded
the zone of interpretive discretion given to administrative agencies, effectively abandoning the
traditional interpretive methodology.” 202 As he describes, “[t]he opinion in Gray v. Powell
heralded a new era,” and Hearst and Skidmore gave further impetus to the Court’s new
principles. 203
But, Bamzai says, Congress attempted to undo this situation when it enacted the APA:
“Read against the history of the APA’s adoption, section 706 is best interpreted as an attempt to
revive the traditional methodology and to instruct courts to review legal questions using
independent judgment and the canons of construction.” 204 Responding to the academic debate
about the meaning of § 706, he writes that “[t]he most natural reading of section 706 . . . is that [it]
adopted the traditional interpretive methodology that had prevailed from the beginning of the
Republic until the 1940s and, thereby, incorporated the customary-and-contemporary canons of
construction.” 205 He apparently does not claim that the Act adopted these two canons as such.
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Bamzai, Origins, supra note 21, at 966-69.
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194 U.S. 106 (1904).

201
See Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 275 (1942) (“While the first of these circulars followed
the Act by 13 years, the weight to be accorded them is not dependent on strict contemporaneity.”); United States v.
Reynolds, 250 U.S. 104, 109 (1919) (“This ruling was made in the year 1910, and may be inconsistent with some
previous rulings of the Department . . . . Nevertheless it is entitled to weight as an administrative interpretation of the
[1887] act.”).
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Rather, he seems to argue that the Act sought to revive the pre-1940 regime of “independent” or
“de novo” review, and the two canons were “part and parcel” of de novo review. 206
Regardless of the precise manner in which Bamzai might express his article’s thesis, I do
not think it is the “most natural reading” of the statute. To the contrary, it is decidedly
unconvincing. In the first place, he offers no explicit evidence that any participant in the legislative
debate specifically intended for § 706 to jettison the precedents of the past six years and thereby
revive pre-1940s case law. Instead, he infers that purpose from various statutory interpretation
arguments, including (a) the fact that the statute refers to constitutional review and statutory review
in the same sentence; 207 (b) the fact that Congress did not adopt the pro-deference proviso favored
by the minority of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure; 208 and (c)
various legislative history quotes. 209 I have addressed all of these arguments earlier in this article
and will not repeat that analysis here. 210
Moreover, several aspects of the legislative record weigh against Bamzai’s thesis. 211 If
anything, the legislative history points to the opposite conclusion. In a letter to the Senate Judiciary
Committee in October 1945, the Attorney General asserted that the APA provision that became §
706 “declares the existing law concerning the scope of judicial review.” 212 “Existing law” can
hardly be equated with “the law of a half dozen years ago.” To be sure, one could be skeptical
about the Attorney General’s position because he represented his client agencies (although, as I
noted earlier, the Supreme Court has not shared that skepticism). 213 Nevertheless, if the APA’s
legislative sponsors had been pursuing the objective that Bamzai posits, one would have expected
them to place their objections to the Attorney General’s characterization on the public record, as
they did with other issues on which the two sides disagreed. 214 The absence of protest against the
Attorney General’s position regarding judicial review of legal issues invites an inference that these
sponsors had no particular quarrel with “existing law” in this regard.
I also referred earlier to the remark by Carl McFarland, the chairman of the ABA’s
Committee on Administrative Procedure, that “the scope of review should be as it now is” 215—not
206

Id. at 987-88, 990.
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Id. at 985-86.
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Id. at 988-90.

210

See supra Parts II.C (constitutional review), II.D.2 (committee minority’s clause and legislative history

quotes).
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For different versions of a similar critique, see Sunstein, Chevron as Law, supra note 23, at 1650-52; Green,
supra note 24, at 686-91.
212
Letter from Attorney General Clark to Senator McCarran, supra note 110. Of course, this is the same as the
interpretation in his APA manual two years later. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
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“as it was up until six years ago.” It would be odd to conclude that legislators undertook a rollback
of judicial review doctrine if that move lacked support from the ABA committee, the entity that
had principally spearheaded the movement to curb the agencies’ power through legislation.
Indeed, McFarland’s position highlights what is so inherently implausible about Bamzai’s
interpretation of § 706. Although the drive for administrative procedure legislation had originated
as an initiative that would put strong curbs on agency power, that thrust was progressively diluted
during the legislative process in the interest of securing broad support and, ultimately, President
Truman’s signature. The ABA committee played a crucial role in that process of accommodation.
In late stages of the deliberations, its hardline members were largely replaced by moderates, of
whom McFarland was one. 216 That committee played a leading role in forging a compromise
bill. 217 Eventually Congress adopted the bill with unanimous support. It is unlikely that the New
Deal supporters in Congress would have been receptive to as substantial a retrenchment from thenprevailing Supreme Court case law as Bamzai maintains. To the contrary, the compromise that
the contending political forces had reached seems to have included taking no action regarding
judicial review of legal issues.
A further argument renders Bamzai’s thesis even more improbable. To accept that thesis,
one would have to suppose that the legislative sponsors decided to use the APA to roll back the
law of judicial review of agency legal interpretations without telling anyone. The problem with
that supposition is not merely that they apparently declined to take issue with the Attorney General.
Overturning a half dozen or more well-known Supreme Court cases is not an enterprise that
Congress would be at all likely to pursue without any fanfare. Sunstein compares the legislative
silence with a dog that failed to bark in the night. 218 I think he is right about that. Indeed,
considering how many legislative players participated in debates over the APA, the absence of any
overt support for the rollback that Bamzai posits looks like an entire kennelful of silent dogs.
As is well known, exactly that sort of noisy debate did occur in connection with another
issue relating to the scope of review that § 706 would prescribe. All administrative lawyers who
are familiar with the Supreme Court’s leading decision in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB219
know this story from Justice Frankfurter’s extended narrative in that opinion. Members of
Congress became convinced that courts were being too lenient in their application of the
substantial evidence test to judicial review of fact issues. Senators and Representatives spoke out
on this issue, commentators took notice at the time (and afterwards), and in due course Congress
“expressed its mood not merely by oratory but by legislation.” 220 This vigorous debate was just
what one would expect to observe when Congress sets out to rectify a problem—or at least
perceived problem—with a substantial body of Supreme Court case law. The absence of similar
216
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fireworks accompanying what Bamzai claims was a comparable revamping of administrative law
doctrine is telling.
Additionally, factions within Congress have tried several times in subsequent years to
promote legislation that would abolish or sharply curtail judicial deference on legal issues. All of
these measures elicited legislative hearings, floor speeches, wide publicity, and scholarly
commentary. These proposed measures included the so-called Bumpers Amendment in the late
1970s and early 1980s, 221 and again in the mid-1990s, 222 as well as the Separation of Powers
Restoration Act 223 in our own day. The complete absence of such an outcry in the leadup to the
APA fortifies the inference that the sponsors of the Act did not seek, let alone achieve, a similar
rollback.
Taken as a whole, the legislative record would surely tend to discourage a court from
concluding that Bamzai’s narrative is true. The Supreme Court has said in the past that “[t]he
normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the
interpretation of a judicially defined concept, it makes that intent specific.” 224 In Kisor, of course,
Justice Gorsuch did endorse Bamzai’s argument. But the Justices did not have a full analysis of
the legislative record before them. Given more complete briefing, the Court could be much less
likely to subscribe to that theory.
F. Post-APA Reactions
One further potential source of data about the meaning of the first sentence of §706 is the
way in which courts and commentators of the era actually interpreted it. The short answer is that
the first sentence of § 706 had essentially no impact on the law immediately following its passage.
The most straightforward explanation for the continuity of the law in this regard is that the judges
and litigants who were closest in time to the Act’s passage were well aware of its limited ambitions.
In this connection, my conclusions are largely the same as those of Sunstein, although I rely on a
somewhat different body of evidence than he does.
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S. 1080, 97th Cong. § 5, 128 Cong. Rec. 5302 (1982); see, e.g., Levin, Identifying Questions of Law, supra
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Although this article is not written from a thoroughgoing “originalist” perspective, the
preceding paragraph suggests two observations that appear to be pertinent to any effort to identify
the “original public meaning” of the first sentence of § 706. First, the most relevant point of
reference in such an inquiry would not be the general public, because the average citizen would
have no occasion to read or apply the APA at all. The Act is addressed to the legal community,
and § 706 in particular is implemented by the judiciary. Scalia and Garner have made a similar
point about the role of terms of art in statutory interpretation:
Sometimes context indicates that a technical meaning applies. Every field of
serious endeavor develops its own nomenclature—sometimes referred to as terms of art.
Where the text is addressing a scientific or technical subject, a specialized meaning is to
be expected: “In terms of art which are above the comprehension of the general bulk of
mankind, recourse, for explanation, must be had to those, who are most experienced in that
art.” And when the law is the subject, ordinary legal meaning is to be expected, which often
differs from common meaning. As Justice Frankfurter eloquently expressed it: “[I]f a
word is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or
other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.”225
Indeed, the Court has applied this reasoning in the specific context of § 706, by characterizing
“substantial evidence” as a term of art. 226 The same logic should apply to other interpretive issues
that arise under the same provision.
Second, this discussion highlights one sense in which originalism in the APA context
should, or at least can, differ from the way in which it typically plays out in the context of
constitutional interpretation. Research into the original public meaning of the Constitution often
entails exploration into centuries-old historical materials that are difficult for nonspecialists to
uncover and interpret. Legislative and judicial materials from the mid-twentieth century, however,
are plentiful and can be retrieved with ordinary methods of legal research. Thus, claims about the
Act’s original public meaning can readily be subjected to a reality check on the basis of evidence
regarding the manner in which the APA actually was interpreted and implemented in the initial
years of the Act’s life. That track record will be the focus of attention here. Speculation about
how the APA’s words “would” be understood by a hypothetical 1940s administrative lawyer
should be unnecessary. 227
225

SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 88, at 73 (citing Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace 177 (1625; A.C.
Campbell trans., 1901), and Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
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1. Case law
As Sunstein notes, 228 the case law record is essentially another story of non-barking dogs.
The first silent dog was Unemployment Compensation Comm’n v. Aragon, 229 a case that was
argued while the APA bill was pending and decided on December 9, 1946. The Court upheld the
agency’s order denying the respondents’ claims for unemployment compensation, with a minor
exception, 230 by relying squarely on the language and reasoning of Hearst. In another case decided
on the same day, FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 231 the Court upheld the Federal Communications
Commission’s denial of a license renewal to a radio station because of the station’s
misrepresentations during the renewal proceedings. The Court’s language plainly conveys the
message of judicial deference: “[I]t is the Commission, not the courts, which must be satisfied
that the public interest will be served by renewing the license. And the fact that we might not have
made the same determination on the same facts does not warrant a substitution of judicial for
administrative discretion since Congress has confided the problem to the latter.” 232 Both decisions
were unanimous, and neither mentioned the APA. Other cases followed the same pattern. 233
This is not to say that agencies won every case in the years immediately following the
APA’s enactment. As one would expect, the Court sometimes ruled against the government,
despite dissenters’ reliance on cases such as Gray and Hearst. 234 If there had been any significant
support in those years for the de novo interpretation of § 706, one would have expected the Court
to have relied on that section’s supposed abolition of judicial deference on legal questions. But
that never happened.
The Court’s famous decision in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II) 235 illustrates both sides
in this equation. Although this 1947 case is best known for its declaration that federal agencies
should have broad leeway to use adjudication, rather than rulemaking, in their development of new
policies, the Court also upheld on the merits a Securities and Exchange Commission decision that
had rejected a holding company’s reorganization plan. The Commission had found that the plan
was not “fair and equitable” to security holders, as required by the Public Utility Holding Company
Act. Justice Murphy’s opinion for the Court was highly deferential: “The Commission’s
conclusion here rests squarely in that area where administrative judgments are entitled to the
228

Id. at 1652-56.
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As to one set of charges, the Court found that the record did not support the agency’s jurisdiction. Id. at 152-

231

329 U.S. 223 (1946).

232

Id. at 229.

53.

233
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greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is the product of administrative experience,
appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the statutory policies, and
responsible treatment of the uncontested facts.” 236
Justice Jackson wrote a scathing dissent, arguing in part:
As there admittedly is no law or regulation to support this order, we peruse the
Court’s opinion diligently to find on what grounds it [now upholds the Commission]. We
find but one. That is the principle of judicial deference to administrative experience. . . .
I suggest that administrative experience is of weight in judicial review only to this
point — it is a persuasive reason for deference to the Commission in the exercise of its
discretionary powers under and within the law. It cannot be invoked to support action
outside of the law. And what action is, and what is not, within the law must be determined
by courts . . . Surely an administrative agency is not a law unto itself, but the Court does
not really face up to the fact that this is the justification it is offering for sustaining the
Commission action.237
If § 706 had been thought at the time to contain a strong affirmation of the courts’ responsibility
for deciding legal questions, one would have expected Justice Jackson to cite to it. He, of course,
would have been well aware of the Act. As Attorney General, he had drafted a memo that President
Roosevelt had attached to his veto message on the predecessor bill (the Walter-Logan bill). 238 In
his opinion for the Court in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 239 written a few years after Chenery II,
Jackson discussed the genesis of the APA in detail, demonstrating his familiarity with the
legislation. 240 But Jackson did not rely on the APA to support his argument in his Chenery II
dissent. The most likely reason is that he, like others, did not suppose that Congress had meant to
say anything particularly significant in the APA about judicial review of questions of law.
I could continue to multiply negative examples, but it should suffice for me to note I have
found no case that detracts from Sunstein’s finding that “[f]rom 1946 to 1960, the Court never
indicated that section 706 rejected the idea that courts might defer to agency interpretations of
law.” 241 Meanwhile, the Court did cite during the same period to other judicial review provisions
in the APA. The best known example is Universal Camera, with its classic explication of the
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meaning of substantial evidence, but the Court also relied on the APA in decisions on matters such
as preclusion of judicial review, 242 forum selection, 243 and review of constitutional questions. 244
I do not want to ignore the lower courts. In 1949, a pair of authors undertook to examine
all court decisions that had been decided during the first three years since the Act had become
effective. Initially, they reported that “[c]areful investigation of Supreme Court decisions since
the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act fails to reveal any affirmative holdings or dicta
construing or applying the statutory language of the Administrative Procedure Act.” 245 Turning
to lower court cases, the authors did find a number of decisions in which courts had concluded that
the APA had broadened the range of cases that would be judicially reviewable. 246 “On the other
hand,” they continued, “there do not seem to be any decisions thus far which would justify a
conclusion that courts have been empowered by the Act to conduct any more exhaustive review
of a given action, once determined to be reviewable, than previously existed. It is with regard to
this aspect of judicial review that the Act appears to be merely declaratory of preexisting law.” 247
2. Commentary
Law review commentary written soon after the APA’s enactment offers raw material for
further inquiry as to how the first sentence of § 706 was originally understood. Arguably, the
historical record of contemporaneous scholarship does not deserve the same level of credibility
that judicial case law does, because any given commentator does not necessarily speak for a wide
segment of the legal community. But proponents of the de novo interpretation of the first sentence
of § 706 have resorted to this source of potential insight, and so I will take it up here.
More specifically, the proponents have relied heavily on an analysis that John Dickinson
published in 1947. 248 Considering the article solely on its own terms, that reliance is
understandable. He was an eminent scholar whose past writings had exerted enormous influence
on administrative law thinking during the preceding two decades. 249 His article on the APA
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the proposition that “[j]udicial review normally includes issues of the constitutionality of enactments and action
thereunder”).
245

Clark L. Fauver & A. Stuard Young, Jr., The Administrative Procedure Act and Judicial Review of Agency
Actions, 37 GEO. L.J. 537, 561 (1949).
246

Id. at 568.

247

Id.

248

Dickerson, supra note 143.

249

See supra note 178. Dickinson’s formalist analysis in this essay was almost the complete opposite of the
heavily pragmatic thrust of his earlier work. See JAFFE, supra note 149, at 570 n.79 (recognizing this shift); Bamzai,
Origins, supra note 21, at 993 (same). People should not be faulted for changing their minds. However, it may be
that the practicality of his former approach contributed at that time to its wide acceptance, and the reduced flexibility

44

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3761989

directly challenged the Attorney General’s manual’s assertion that the APA made no change in the
scope of judicial review of agency action.
The scope of Dickinson’s critique was not altogether clear. His main objection to pre-APA
case law seemed to be that “[t]he courts have begun to draw a distinction between two kinds of
questions of law: Those which involve what are sometimes spoken of as general law or legal
principles, and others which involve the construction of technical terms and the application of
knowledge thought to be expert and specialized.” 250 In Dobson v. Commissioner, 251 the Court had
appeared to say that the latter type of questions should be reviewed only for reasonableness, if they
could be reviewed at all. 252 Dickinson argued that the APA had disapproved this theory and would
thenceforth “require the Court in a review proceeding to look for itself at even those technical
questions.” 253 To that extent, Dickinson’s article stood on solid ground and was not particularly
unconventional. Even in that era, the Dobson reasoning was harshly criticized by some other
scholars as an outlier, and the case was soon legislatively overruled. 254 On the other hand,
Dickinson’s article also contained broad language declaring that the first sentence of § 706 would
“impose a clear mandate that all [questions of law] shall be decided by the reviewing Court for
itself, and in the exercise of its own independent judgment.” Despite this ambiguity, I will for the
sake of argument treat Dickinson as a supporter of the same position that Justice Gorsuch later
espoused.
Dickinson justified this reading almost entirely on the basis of his reading of the language
of the Act. I have explained above why I think the language is not nearly as self-explanatory as
he maintained. 255 A secondary argument, which he deployed only in a footnote, was grounded in
Congress’s failure to adopt an explicit deference requirement, as the minority members of the
Attorney General’s Committee had proposed. That argument was also fallacious, for reasons I
have discussed earlier. 256 For the moment, however, our concern is not with whether he was right
or wrong, but rather with the very existence of his interpretation, as evidence of a contemporaneous
interpretation of the first sentence of § 706.
of his subsequent analysis—at least if broadly interpreted—was one reason why his reading of the first sentence of
§ 706 did not ultimately carry the day in the growth of scope-of-review doctrine.
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Dickinson, supra note 143, at 516-17.
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320 U.S. 489 (1943).
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See id. at 504 (“What, in the circumstances of this case, was a proper adjustment of the basis was thus purely
an accounting problem and therefore a question of fact for the Tax Court to determine.”) (emphasis added).
253

Dickinson, supra note 143, at 517.
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See JAFFE, supra note 149, at 581 (“Dobson . . . was untenable. It involved the Court in a hopeless morass of
decisions, distinctions, and qualifications, in a constant clutter of contradictions inevitably engendered by the
opinion’s absence of intelligible content. It deserved its subsequent quietus by Congress [in 1948].”) This was strong
language, coming as it did from a defender of Gray and Hearst (see id. at 575). See also Paul, supra note 156, at 785
(“The more one studies the Dobson opinion, the greater the confusion, for the entire opinion seems to ‘walk on
quicksand.’”). But see Davis, Scope, supra note 157, at 567-69 (defending the Dobson reasoning).
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See supra Part II.B.
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See supra Part II.D.2.
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The main problem with putting weight on Dickerson’s article is that his view was almost
completely isolated. Indeed, my initial research into this issue persuaded me that he was literally
the only law review commentator who claimed, during the period immediately following the
APA’s enactment, that the first sentence of § 706 directed the courts to exercise independent
judgment on all questions of law. Eventually, I discovered that this conclusion was not quite
accurate. An essay by Frank Hinman Jr. cited to Dickinson’s article and endorsed his analysis. 257
Hinman’s essay was very brief, and its author was apparently not a lawyer—but still, it existed.
Apart from this one exception, however, the verdict of contemporary scholarship regarding
Dickinson’s position appears to have been entirely negative. Several commentators expressly
disagreed with Dickinson’s analysis. Among them were a few who would later go on to renown
as among the leading voices in administrative law scholarship, including Kenneth Culp Davis, 258
Louis L. Jaffe, 259 and Bernard Schwartz, 260 as well as others whose names are not as well
recognized today. 261 One of the points these authors made was that Dickinson had overlooked the
APA’s recital, elsewhere in § 10, that the section would apply “except to the extent that . . . agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 262 Modern authorities on administrative law
would probably not rely on that specific textual argument, because in today’s world that clause in
the APA is construed narrowly. But their analysis still rings true to the extent that they concluded
that the APA does not turn over all legal interpretation to judicial hands. As Jaffe put it, “[a] court
must . . . decide as a ‘question of law’ whether there is ‘discretion’ in the premises, and once the
discretion is established, its exercise if ‘reasonable’ is free of control.” 263 Aside from disputing
the specific analysis in Dickinson’s article, all of these authors appeared to share Davis’s
conclusion about the first sentence of § 706: “The APA provision probably does not change the
scope of review.” 264
There were other authors who did not take issue with Dickinson by name but nevertheless
made clear that they did not share his viewpoint. I am referring here to authors who expressly
stated that they did not foresee any changes in the courts’ approach to review of legal (or mixed)
questions, 265 as well as authors who specifically examined § 10 without any indication that they
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Frank Hinman Jr., The Effect of the Administrative Procedure Act on Judicial Review of Administrative
Action, 20 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 267, 276-77 (1948).
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Davis, Scope, supra note 157, at 562.
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JAFFE, supra note 149, at 569-70 & n.79.
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Schwartz, supra note 151, at 83-85 (predicting that, contrary to Dickinson’s argument, the APA would bring
about no diminution in judicial deference on mixed questions of law and fact, as exemplified by Gray v. Powell).
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Scanlan, supra note 109, at 529-32; S. Walter Shine, Administrative Procedure Act: Judicial Review
“Hotchpot”?, 36 GEO. L.J. 16, 29-31 (1947).
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See Reginald Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Overestimation, 60 YALE L.J. 581, 587
(1950) (“Nor has the Act diminished the force of the most recent judge-made administrative legal doctrine, giving
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thought the provision had done anything noteworthy with regard to review of issues of law. 266 For
example, Nathaniel Nathanson quoted the Attorney General’s manual as stating that the APA
restates current law on judicial review. 267 Although Nathanson did not flatly say that he agreed
with that assessment, he certainly did not take issue with it. In discussing the effect of the Act
upon judicial review, he discussed reviewability, the substantial evidence debate, and judicial
control of undue administrative delay – but not the standard of judicial review for legal
questions. 268 Another interesting contribution in this category was an article by Frederick Blachly
and Miriam Oatman. 269 In contrast to most commentators, Blachly and Oatman were overtly
hostile to the Act, regarding it as a sellout to the ABA and a disastrous attack on administrative
governance. Judicial review was one of the targets of this polemic. They attacked § 10 for
subjecting the full range of administrative actions to the set of review standards that are now found
in § 706(2). In their view, this step was insensitive to the variety of statutory provisions that
Congress had written in particular subject areas. For all of their vitriol, however, they did not
identify an expansion in judicial power over review of questions of law as among the Act’s
offenses. If, in these authors’ view, the first sentence of § 706 had been as much of a departure
from the status quo as Dickinson maintained, their failure to mention it would be difficult to
explain.
In sum, one might say that academic commentary in Dickinson’s era was “divided”
regarding the issue he raised. With only one exception, however, that would be true only in the
sense that some commentators expressly disagreed with Dickinson, and others only tacitly
disagreed with him. The overall verdict of more than a dozen contemporaneous commentators
was clear: The first sentence of § 706 did not alter the scope of review on issues of law. That
verdict was, indeed, in accord with the reactions of the courts themselves.
III. Chevron and Section 706
The thrust of the foregoing analysis is that the first sentence of § 706 of the APA does not
require reviewing courts to decide issues of law without any judicial deference. I have argued here
that, on the contrary, the sentence leaves open a range of possible interpretations. At the same
time, however, I have disavowed the notion that the APA’s commands are infinitely elastic. Thus,
there is room to ask whether the modern Court may have strayed outside the permissible range.
preponderant weight to agency holdings involving both so-called mixed questions and the agency’s qualified
experience.”); Herbert Kaufman, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 26 B.U. L. REV. 479, 500-01 (1946).
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Ray A. Brown, The Federal “Administrative Procedure Act,” 1947 WIS. L. REV. 66, 83-87 (1947); Note, The
Impact of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act on Deportation Proceedings, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 73, 85 (1949).
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(1946).
268

Id. at 416-18. To similar effect, see Comment, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act: Codification or
Reform?, 56 YALE L.J. 670, 689-91 (1947) (“it would seem that the Act merely codifies the pre-existing law of judicial
review,” except perhaps with regard to availability of review, substantial evidence, and de novo trials).
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Frederick F. Blechly & Miriam E. Oatman, Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 34 GEO. L.J. 407, 428,
431 (1946). See also Julius Cohen, Legislative Injustice and the Supremacy of Law: An Appraisal of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, 26 NEB. L. REV. 323, 339-44 (1947) (objecting to the APA’s expansion of access to
the courts and of substantial evidence review, but not mentioning judicial review of legal issues).
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To put the issue more concretely, is the Chevron doctrine compatible with the first sentence of §
706? After all, that standard of review didn’t exist in its modern form before 1984, and obviously
the drafters of the APA didn’t specifically intend to codify it. 270
I will maintain in this Part that the Chevron doctrine, as we understand it today, is a
defensible interpretation of the APA. I use the relatively restrained word “defensible” because the
debate over the merits of Chevron implicates a host of hotly contested prudential factors that are
well beyond the scope of this article. 271 But I propose to show, at least briefly, that, whatever one
thinks about whether the doctrine is desirable, the APA need not be construed to prohibit it.
Cass Sunstein addresses this issue in the article that I have cited recurrently in earlier
sections. He notes that Congress knew about cases like Hearst and Gray and did not disapprove
them. Thus, although he maintains that “[w]e do not know what Congress wanted,” 272 one possible
answer is that § 706 could be “taken as a codification of preexisting law, which allowed courts to
defer to agency interpretations of law—sometimes. Chevron is a reasonable rendering of the
meaning of ‘sometimes,’ fairly close to what the Supreme Court was doing in the decade before
the APA was enacted.” 273 I tend to agree with Sunstein’s historical argument as far as it goes, but
he seems to have developed it less fully than he might have. I will use this Part to expand on his
analysis by presenting a fuller account as to how Chevron can be reconciled with § 706.
In order to develop this argument, I will need to break down the Chevron standard
analytically into two discrete components. The test is generally understood to mean that when a
court perceives, at “step one,” that the statute to be interpreted is ambiguous in relation to the
precise question at issue, the court should presume that Congress chose to leave that question to
the agency’s discretion. 274 If the agency’s interpretation survives that inquiry (i.e., if the court has
not found that the statute unambiguously negates that interpretation), the court should consider, at
“step two,” whether the interpretation is reasonable and should uphold it if it meets that relatively
undemanding test. For expository purposes, it will be convenient to discuss those steps in reverse
order.
Instead of discussing the Chevron formula in the abstract, however, I will defend it in light
of the manner in which the doctrine operates in the real world. Litigants manage with some
270

A similar question could be asked about Auer deference. Although that standard of review was largely based
on Seminole Rock, which predated the APA, it has undergone considerable evolution since its initial articulation.
Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Widermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 65 EMORY L.J. 47 (2015).
Nevertheless, the Court’s inconclusive encounter with that doctrine in Kisor may make the Justices reluctant to revisit
the merits of Auer deference any time soon.
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Sunstein, Chevron as Law, supra note 23, at 1664; see id. at 1663. Sunstein’s cautious approach to this point
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more deferential reading that tends to justify Chevron. As should be apparent from the discussion in Part II.E.2-.4 of
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frequency to convince courts that a regulatory statute has a “clear” meaning that overcomes the
presumption at step one, or that an agency’s interpretation is too “unreasoned” or “unreasonable”
to pass muster under Chevron’s second step, 275 Also, pursuant to what is known as “step zero,” a
number of types of cases are categorically excluded from Chevron’s “domain.” 276 The best known
source of exclusion is United States v. Mead Corp., 277 which largely limits Chevron deference to
interpretations reached through notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. When
one puts all of these limiting factors together, the overall picture is a fairly nuanced regime. This
mixed picture does not mean, in my view, that the Chevron doctrine is rife with inconsistency;
rather, these opportunities for judicial control are integral features of the doctrine. The regime is
comparable to the one that Justice Kagan set forth in Kisor in the context of agency interpretations
of regulations, 278 although in the Chevron context the Court has been developing these limiting
factors for decades.
A good starting point for appraisal of the step two component of Chevron is Sunstein’s
argument that the drafters of the APA were aware of cases such as Gray and Hearst and can be
taken as having acquiesced in them by not taking action to disapprove them. That observation is
relevant to Chevron, because the second step of the Chevron formula is best understood to be
equivalent to the proposition that questions of law application are primarily for the agency that
administers the statute. 279 At various times in our history, such questions have gone by other
names, such as “questions of fact” or “mixed questions of law and fact.” 280 In our more
positivist age, courts more often characterize issues of law application in terms of the review of
the exercise of delegated authority. But these are essentially equivalent names for the same
underlying type of issue. In this sense, one can draw a straight line from the deference
prescribed in the early 1940s cases to the deference contemplated in the second step of the
Chevron test. Indeed, in the Chevron opinion, Justice Stevens specifically highlighted the
importance of delegation, whether express or implied. 281
There should be no serious doubt about the legitimacy of deferential review in this context,
because if Congress directed that the agency should decide a given issue, judicial deference is
simply acquiescence in the legislature’s choice. It is not inconsistent with the judicial responsibility
275

See Emily Hammond et al., Judicial Review of Statutory Issues Under the Chevron Doctrine, in ABA
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to say what the law is, because, by virtue of the delegation itself, the law is (within reasonable
limits) what the agency says it is. This theory had been articulated as far back as the era in which
the APA was adopted, 282 and it had become a salient theme in administrative law even before
Chevron emerged as a new paradigm. 283 Even Justice Thomas, despite his emerging view that
Chevron is unconstitutional, appears to accept the legitimacy of deference under these
circumstances. 284 Moreover, it is widely recognized that Chevron step two is analytically similar
to, and perhaps largely coextensive with, review to determine whether an action is “arbitrary,
capricious [or] an abuse of discretion” under § 706(2)(A) of the Act. 285 Abuse of discretion review
is self-evidently deferential rather than independent (although it can be a significant source of
judicial control, especially when applied with a “hard look”).
The foregoing analysis is incomplete, however, because Chevron did more than merely
acknowledge the necessary consequences of delegation.
According to the prevailing
interpretation, it also decided that when, at step one, a court perceives the statute to be ambiguous
in relation to the precise question at issue, it should presume that Congress chose to leave that
question to the agency’s discretion. 286 This aspect of the test did not exist before 1984. Here the
reader should recall my earlier claim that § 706 need not be read to mean that the exact rules that
were prevalent in 1946 must persist indefinitely. 287 In that light, the question to ask about the
Chevron presumption is not whether it is the same as the legal principles that the courts applied in
1946, but rather whether it is a reasonable extrapolation from them.
The Chevron regime has some similarities with the case law that prevailed at the time of
the APA’s enactment, but also some differences. The similarities lie in the prudential policy
factors that have been commonly cited as justifications for judicial deference to administrators’
views on legal issues, such as their technical expertise, experience in dealing with the subject
matter, and responsibility for implementing their mandates effectively on a concrete level. Those
282
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factors were prominent in the early case law, 288 as well as in post-APA cases prior to Chevron. 289
The Court in Chevron echoed these themes, although it added a focus on the agencies’ political
accountability. 290
On the other hand, the Chevron doctrine differs from its antecedents in that, instead of
treating these factors merely as relevant considerations that should be taken into account along
with other statutory construction arguments, it has transmuted them into a presumption or default
principle. Justice Scalia has explained that choice on the basis that it makes the law in this area
more predictable and consistent. 291 Probably it also reflects the Court’s belief, during Chevron’s
ascendancy, that a relatively structured, formal approach promotes adherence to the pro-deference
policies underlying the doctrine.
Although the courts’ continued support for these goals in future years may be open to
doubt, the fact that the doctrine is expressed as a presumption is not an anomaly within the sphere
of administrative common law. The presumption is comparable to canons of statutory
interpretation that the Court has adopted in many areas of the law, 292 including but not limited to
administrative cases, such as the presumptions against retroactive or extraterritorial applications
of regulatory statutes, disfavoring federal encroachments on traditional state powers, etc. 293
Putting all of these considerations together—Chevron’s nominal strong stand in favor of
deference, as well as its flexibility in practical application—the net result seems to be that agency
interpretations are more likely to prevail on judicial review when Chevron applies than when it
does not, but the changes that courts have wrought in this area are essentially a matter of degree. 294
Thus, if the consideration that courts gave to deference factors in the 1940s could reasonably be
described as falling within the meaning of “deciding” a legal question, or “determining” the
meaning of a regulation, the same can be said of the manner in which courts utilize such factors
today.
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It can be argued, of course, that Chevron brings about an excessive intrusion on judicial
independence, notwithstanding the qualifying factors that I have discussed above. Revisionist
scholars can make a case for that proposition on the basis of our legal traditions, including
constitutional values. This article does not undertake to evaluate the doctrine on that level. My
thesis here is simply that such an assertion cannot be derived from the APA.
A point to keep in mind, in connection with the broader issue of Chevron’s validity, is that
the judiciary has essentially imposed the doctrine on itself (even if it is phrased as a presumption
about congressional intent). That point tends to blunt the force of the argument, advanced by
Justice Thomas among others, 295 that Chevron violates the constitutional separation of powers by
intruding on the exclusive province of the judiciary. It is doubtless true that Chevron and Auer, in
practical operation, call for more deference to executive authority than Justice Thomas and some
other jurists would individually choose to give. Surely, however, it is not unconstitutional for the
Court to adopt principles of interpretation and to prescribe a framework for applying those
principles. Judges are expected to adhere to that framework, but it is the Court that originated it
and can modify it over time (as it indeed does). The wisdom of these principles is of course up for
debate; but, because the judiciary itself is the source of the principles, I do not see their existence
as an illegitimate intrusion on judicial independence. In other words, “independent judgment”
does not have to mean “independent of the Court’s jurisprudence on scope of review.” The fact
that the force and breadth of the presumption remains within the courts’ control helps to explain
why the Court has continued to insist that the Chevron test is consistent with judicial
independence. 296
In sum, I believe that the evolution of judicial review of legal issues under the APA falls
well within the scope of administrative common lawmaking (even if nominally phrased in terms
of what the Court says Congress “would expect”). What the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees said about § 706 in the 1940s is also defensible as a characterization of the Chevron
regime: “[Q]uestions of law are for the courts rather than agencies to decide in the last analysis.” 297
IV. Conclusion
One might have thought that seventy-five years of experience with various APA deference
standards, including more than thirty-five years of applying Chevron, would make it unnecessary
to inquire very deeply into whether the APA allows judicial deference to agencies on issues of
legal interpretation. Indeed, an article that asserts that “the courts have been getting it right for
decades” is not usually considered to possess a very compelling message, especially within a
profession that often prizes contrarianism. 298 Yet the advent of a radical critique of longstanding
doctrine, endorsed by influential jurists and well-respected scholars, among others, seems to
require just such a treatment.
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I have contended here that the text of § 706 is essentially noncommittal on the issue of
what deference, if any, courts should display when they review agency legal interpretations.
Moreover, the legislative history of the Act confirms that, despite vigorous disagreements about
other issues, the participants in the legislative deliberations were not particularly concerned about
the standard of review for legal issues. They were content to leave the operative law on that subject
as it stood. Nearly all contemporary observers understood that decision. Thus, they very properly
proceeded without any supposition that the APA had made any change in the applicable law. In
short, the purported “de novo” mandate of the Act has not been “forgotten”; it never existed in the
first place.
One has to expect that, even if the conclusions of this article were to be broadly accepted,
the campaign to dislodge judicial deference to agencies on issues of law would continue on other
fronts. Proponents of that campaign, however, should at least be called on to defend it on its
intrinsic merits, rather than on the basis of a dubious APA argument. If this article serves to
provide ammunition against the latter argument, or perhaps to discourage the proponents from
relying on it in the first place, it will have served its purpose.
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